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During the 1990s the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), which produced “smart” weapons like cruise missiles, came of age. This apparently transformed how America viewed the relationship between force and international relations. It looked like technology was framing foreign policy. In particular, smart weapons enabled President Clinton to combine risk minimization with an expanded security agenda. However, we should be wary of ascribing technological determinism to the conflicts of the 1990s dominated by Washington's flexing of its strategic superiority, such as its bombing of Belgrade. As shown by comparison with post‐“9–11” US strategy, Washington's stance in the 1990s was shaped by linkages between technology and specific political circumstances. As these circumstances changed, so did the RMA's place in US efforts to shape world order.
Australian Journal of Politics and History – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2006
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