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At the end of his monumental work on the origins and philosophical background of present-day psychology D. B. Klein expresses his agreement with the view that âthe radical separation of psychology from philosophy has not been an unmixed blessing to either disciplineâ.l Perhaps there is no sphere of psychology where this opinion so merits attention as that concerned with the person. Indeed a study of the unconscious philosophical presuppositions in this field would probably illustrate that the separation is not so âradicalâ as is usually supposed. There are, of course, conscious presuppositions to be found occasionally. As would be expected, a Russian contributor to the Encyclopedia of Psychology writes that âthe general methodological (philosophical) foundations of Soviet Psychology are a sine qua non and will remain so in the visible futureâ.2 But even an American contributor, writing on Communication, can speak of the necessity of âsome philosophyâ as a help to setting up experiments âas the subject is both practical and concerns peopleâ. He writes, âTo unite these two aspects in discussion the writer has found most useful the philosophy of Charles Sanders Pierce which he called Pragmatismâ. Still, by and large, western empirical psychology has attempted to
The Heythrop Journal – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 1975
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