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The FOOL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ST ANSELM'S ARGUMENT

The FOOL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ST ANSELM'S ARGUMENT Footnotes 1 I am especially grateful to Harry Silverstein for his acute comments on earlier versions of this paper. 2 This second condition is useful in dealing with the ontological status of an argument which is an incomplete attempt to state a valid argument. One wishes to judge the ontological status of the complete, valid argument that was intended rather than the incomplete and invalid account of it. To do this one invokes condition two and requires that no empirical premise need be added to the short, invalid argument to capture the full, valid argument that was intended. This second condition could, however, be avoided. One might merely apply condition one—no empirical claims may actually occur as working premises—to the fully expressed argument that was intended though not stated. This procedure has the general advantage of not assuming that invalid arguments are incomplete attempts at valid ones, but it is not as useful for dealing with Anselm's argument where this assumption is usually warranted. By asking what additional premises are needed to make Anselm's reasoning valid, one comes to fully understand the content of his argument. 1 Charlesworth, M. J. (trans.), St Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford, 1965), p. 117. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Heythrop Journal Wiley

The FOOL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ST ANSELM'S ARGUMENT

The Heythrop Journal , Volume 15 (4) – Oct 1, 1974

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0018-1196
eISSN
1468-2265
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2265.1974.tb00780.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Footnotes 1 I am especially grateful to Harry Silverstein for his acute comments on earlier versions of this paper. 2 This second condition is useful in dealing with the ontological status of an argument which is an incomplete attempt to state a valid argument. One wishes to judge the ontological status of the complete, valid argument that was intended rather than the incomplete and invalid account of it. To do this one invokes condition two and requires that no empirical premise need be added to the short, invalid argument to capture the full, valid argument that was intended. This second condition could, however, be avoided. One might merely apply condition one—no empirical claims may actually occur as working premises—to the fully expressed argument that was intended though not stated. This procedure has the general advantage of not assuming that invalid arguments are incomplete attempts at valid ones, but it is not as useful for dealing with Anselm's argument where this assumption is usually warranted. By asking what additional premises are needed to make Anselm's reasoning valid, one comes to fully understand the content of his argument. 1 Charlesworth, M. J. (trans.), St Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford, 1965), p. 117.

Journal

The Heythrop JournalWiley

Published: Oct 1, 1974

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