Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
Footnotes 1 I am especially grateful to Harry Silverstein for his acute comments on earlier versions of this paper. 2 This second condition is useful in dealing with the ontological status of an argument which is an incomplete attempt to state a valid argument. One wishes to judge the ontological status of the complete, valid argument that was intended rather than the incomplete and invalid account of it. To do this one invokes condition two and requires that no empirical premise need be added to the short, invalid argument to capture the full, valid argument that was intended. This second condition could, however, be avoided. One might merely apply condition one—no empirical claims may actually occur as working premises—to the fully expressed argument that was intended though not stated. This procedure has the general advantage of not assuming that invalid arguments are incomplete attempts at valid ones, but it is not as useful for dealing with Anselm's argument where this assumption is usually warranted. By asking what additional premises are needed to make Anselm's reasoning valid, one comes to fully understand the content of his argument. 1 Charlesworth, M. J. (trans.), St Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford, 1965), p. 117.
The Heythrop Journal – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 1974
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.