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SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY

SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY Footnotes 1 . For an account of the role of corporate restructuring in addressing both the U.S. and a worldwide problem of chronic overcapacity, see Michael C. Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,” Journal of Finance (1993); for a shorter, less technical version, see the article by the same title in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , Volume 6 Number 4 (Winter 1994 ) . 2 . S. Postrel and R. Rumelt , “ Incentives, Routines, and Self Command ,” Industrial and Corporate Change , V. 1 , 1992 , pp. 397 – 425 . 3 . To some extent, this non‐optimal behavior can be incorporated into REMM by recognizing that individuals’ visions of the world and their ability to act or react depend on various factors (such as the intensity of emotions) that have the power to change, if only temporarily, their perception of “goods.” Such an expanded model could explain deviant behavior as the result of maximizing actions in situations where an individual's perceptions of the world are systematically different, or more constrained, than normal. For a survey of the effects of stress on the behavior of humans http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Wiley

SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1078-1196
eISSN
1745-6622
DOI
10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00404.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Footnotes 1 . For an account of the role of corporate restructuring in addressing both the U.S. and a worldwide problem of chronic overcapacity, see Michael C. Jensen, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,” Journal of Finance (1993); for a shorter, less technical version, see the article by the same title in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , Volume 6 Number 4 (Winter 1994 ) . 2 . S. Postrel and R. Rumelt , “ Incentives, Routines, and Self Command ,” Industrial and Corporate Change , V. 1 , 1992 , pp. 397 – 425 . 3 . To some extent, this non‐optimal behavior can be incorporated into REMM by recognizing that individuals’ visions of the world and their ability to act or react depend on various factors (such as the intensity of emotions) that have the power to change, if only temporarily, their perception of “goods.” Such an expanded model could explain deviant behavior as the result of maximizing actions in situations where an individual's perceptions of the world are systematically different, or more constrained, than normal. For a survey of the effects of stress on the behavior of humans

Journal

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley

Published: Jun 1, 1994

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