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Anima Mea Non Est Ego, 40
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The View from Nowhere
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2008 Wiley Subscription Services
- ISSN
- 0018-1196
- eISSN
- 1468-2265
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-2265.2008.00389.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Physicalism entails that a possible world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world be a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Because what I really am is not a particular human being, there exists a minimal physical duplicate of the actual world which is not a duplicate simpliciter of the actual world. Therefore, physicalism is false.
Journal
The Heythrop Journal – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2008