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Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom

Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom

Accounting & Finance , Volume 49 (3) – Sep 1, 2009

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References (89)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 AFAANZ
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00296.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2009

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