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Listening to Strangers, or: Three Arguments for Bounded Solidarity

Listening to Strangers, or: Three Arguments for Bounded Solidarity Bounded solidarity has recently been criticized on the grounds that it valorizes homogeneity, arbitrarily prioritizes compatriots over outsiders, and is ultimately unnecessary to democracy. In response, defenders argue that solidarity is valuable because it supports the welfare state or a republican ideal of nondomination. This article argues that such defenses fail to demonstrate that bounded solidarity is not superfluous in the way that critics have claimed, leaving the ideal vulnerable to dismissal. Drawing on deliberative democratic theory, it shows that bounded solidarity among citizens is necessary in order to establish the epistemic preconditions of democratic self‐determination. Understood in epistemic terms, bounded solidarity—a disposition among citizens to gather, and assign weight to, the perspectives of other citizens—deserves support because it is inextricable from the valuable goal of democratic self‐rule. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Listening to Strangers, or: Three Arguments for Bounded Solidarity

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References (50)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2023 by the Midwest Political Science Association.
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12671
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Bounded solidarity has recently been criticized on the grounds that it valorizes homogeneity, arbitrarily prioritizes compatriots over outsiders, and is ultimately unnecessary to democracy. In response, defenders argue that solidarity is valuable because it supports the welfare state or a republican ideal of nondomination. This article argues that such defenses fail to demonstrate that bounded solidarity is not superfluous in the way that critics have claimed, leaving the ideal vulnerable to dismissal. Drawing on deliberative democratic theory, it shows that bounded solidarity among citizens is necessary in order to establish the epistemic preconditions of democratic self‐determination. Understood in epistemic terms, bounded solidarity—a disposition among citizens to gather, and assign weight to, the perspectives of other citizens—deserves support because it is inextricable from the valuable goal of democratic self‐rule.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science – Wiley

Published: Jul 1, 2023

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