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This study examines the impact of political connectedness (PC) on enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our analysis confirms that SEC is not captured and shows that firms or executives with stronger PC are more likely to be criminally charged or face bar or suspension than firms or executives with weaker PC. In addition, we document that imposed fines are relatively higher for prosecuted firms and executives with stronger PC. These findings are robust to inclusions of controls for Republican Congress, Republican President, and recent regulatory reforms and are not driven by endogeneity concerns and sample selection bias.
Accounting & Finance – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2022
Keywords: Political connectedness; Corporate misconduct; Securities and Exchange Commission; Prosecution; Enforcement; Litigation
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