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Investor feedback: impact on analyst biases and investor critical evaluation

Investor feedback: impact on analyst biases and investor critical evaluation Financial analysts (‘sell side’) face incentives that result in biased information for investors (‘buy side’). We examine whether a feedback channel from investors to financial analysts (comparable to the broker vote system) reduces these biases and thereby enhances information efficiency. In a controlled experiment with a monetary payment structure, 344 graduate students assume roles as analysts or investors, with the analysts making earnings recommendations for the investors in the presence of biased incentives. Under the treatment condition, the investors provide feedback to the analysts. Consistent with the monetary incentives built into the broker vote system and psychological theories, the presence of this feedback: (i) reduces bias among analysts; and (ii) enhances investors’ critical evaluation of information. Given the informational benefits of investor feedback, we highlight an unintended consequence of the European Union’s decision to abolish indirect payments to analysts from 2018 onwards. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

Investor feedback: impact on analyst biases and investor critical evaluation

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References (88)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Accounting and Finance © 2022 AFAANZ
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/acfi.12806
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Financial analysts (‘sell side’) face incentives that result in biased information for investors (‘buy side’). We examine whether a feedback channel from investors to financial analysts (comparable to the broker vote system) reduces these biases and thereby enhances information efficiency. In a controlled experiment with a monetary payment structure, 344 graduate students assume roles as analysts or investors, with the analysts making earnings recommendations for the investors in the presence of biased incentives. Under the treatment condition, the investors provide feedback to the analysts. Consistent with the monetary incentives built into the broker vote system and psychological theories, the presence of this feedback: (i) reduces bias among analysts; and (ii) enhances investors’ critical evaluation of information. Given the informational benefits of investor feedback, we highlight an unintended consequence of the European Union’s decision to abolish indirect payments to analysts from 2018 onwards.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2022

Keywords: Broker votes; Financial analysts; Forecasts; Investor feedback; Metacognition; Regulation; Self‐affirmation

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