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‘In the beginning was the deed’ but only in the beginning

‘In the beginning was the deed’ but only in the beginning James Russell Cambridge University, UK I have organized my response around the following headings. Questioning whether concepts such as `the executive functions' and `executive dysfunctions' are explanatory or merely descriptive in the case of normal development and autism (Hobson), and asking the related question of whether it is only performance  errors that executive theories explain (Houde, Battacchi). Both points are also made by Bryant. Saying that the present view shares with the Piagetian theory a neglect of the social contribution to pretheoretical self-awareness (Hobson) and to symbolizing (Carpendale). The denial that symbolizing is something that requires explication in nativist terms (Overton), and the denial that it is something whose onset should be timed as late as 12± 18 months of age (Mounoud). Saying that the way in which I describe the pretheoretical contribution of agency owes too much to phenomenology and pays insufficient attention to subpersonal mechanisms (Proust). Arguing that I am managing to describe the contribution of action monitoring at both inappropriately high and inappropriately low levels (Pacherie). Saying that I do not make the idea of executively determined cognitive development work hard enough, mistakenly regarding executive development as, at least in part, the product of http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Developmental Science Wiley

‘In the beginning was the deed’ but only in the beginning

Developmental Science , Volume 2 (3) – Aug 1, 1999

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999
ISSN
1363-755X
eISSN
1467-7687
DOI
10.1111/1467-7687.00074
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

James Russell Cambridge University, UK I have organized my response around the following headings. Questioning whether concepts such as `the executive functions' and `executive dysfunctions' are explanatory or merely descriptive in the case of normal development and autism (Hobson), and asking the related question of whether it is only performance  errors that executive theories explain (Houde, Battacchi). Both points are also made by Bryant. Saying that the present view shares with the Piagetian theory a neglect of the social contribution to pretheoretical self-awareness (Hobson) and to symbolizing (Carpendale). The denial that symbolizing is something that requires explication in nativist terms (Overton), and the denial that it is something whose onset should be timed as late as 12± 18 months of age (Mounoud). Saying that the way in which I describe the pretheoretical contribution of agency owes too much to phenomenology and pays insufficient attention to subpersonal mechanisms (Proust). Arguing that I am managing to describe the contribution of action monitoring at both inappropriately high and inappropriately low levels (Pacherie). Saying that I do not make the idea of executively determined cognitive development work hard enough, mistakenly regarding executive development as, at least in part, the product of

Journal

Developmental ScienceWiley

Published: Aug 1, 1999

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