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As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2013
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