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Since the boom in takeovers in the 1980s, research in both law and financial economics has debated the role of takeover impediments such as poison pills, staggered boards, and state antitakeover laws. Have these impediments entrenched target management to the detriment of shareholders? Or have they increased the bargaining power of target boards of directors and left shareholders, if not better off, then at least unharmed?
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2019
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