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For Heidegger ‘the meaning of being’ is disclosed by ‘pre‐theoretical’ interpretation in a holistic union of mind or ‘subject’ and ‘object’, individual with collective and ‘reason’ with ‘passion’. That the salient ideas of mind, object and virtue can incidentally also intimate ‘theories’ is consistent with this provided that these theories are regarded as merely provisional, in light of his pre‐theoretical approach. The idea that authenticity is virtue for example may be expressed either non‐propositionally as a practice or, wrongly in his view, as a true‐or‐false theory. Holism gives a frame of reference linking these disparate ideas but I argue that it is in each case self‐defeating and a ‘practical contradiction’. I consider first what it means to be a mind or ‘subject’, and how we relate to being; I write ‘being’ not ‘Being’ (and ‘nonbeing’ not ‘Nothing’). He mostly shuns terms such as ‘mind’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ but they flag his attempt to rethink these notions. ‘Objects’ are not only material things, though a hammer is his best‐known example. (BT 25–6) They matter less to him but his discussion invites attention, and I consider more fully their ‘truth’ or what it means for an object to be; I
The Heythrop Journal – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2009
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