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Governments and the media have often attacked financiers for “speculating” in their countries' currencies, thereby forcing them to make drastic and sometimes painful changes in monetary and fiscal policies. This article argues that such accusations have no basis in economic theory, and that “such rhetoric should be seen for what it is: an attempt by politicians and policy‐makers to divert attention and blame from their own mismanagement.” More generally, the author argues that the failure of the general public to understand the social benefits of financial activies such as trading in government bonds, commodity futures, and, more recently, financial derivatives has led throughout history to “prejudice, bad laws, and bad regulations.” Much as the charging of interest and certain forms of insurance were proscribed by the medieval Church, agricultural commodity futures were attacked in the 19th century (and in much of the 20th as well) in the U.S. and elsewhere as thinly disguised forms of gambling. Moreover, the same restrictions that were imposed on gambling and futures markets during the 19th and early 20th centuries are now imposed in many Third‐World countries. Instead of encouraging the use of forward markets by small producers and traders, and promoting the development of organized commodity markets and banks in local centers, most less‐developed countries today support national and international “stabilization” measures such as buffer stocks and regulations like price floors, price ceilings, and crop quotas. Meanwhile, in Western nations, governments continue to accuse financial markets of “destabilizing speculation” and of a myopic obsession with short‐term profitability—even as the U.S. IPO market continues to assign record values to companies that have yet to show profits. Viewed in this light, the media and regulatory assaults on the junk bond markets in the late 1980s and on derivatives in the early 1990s are only the latest in a long line of misguided attacks on financial innovation.
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 1996
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