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References (8)
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José-Miguel Gaspar, M. Massa, Pedro Matos (2005)
Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate ControlS&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series
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A. Knauer, George Serafeim (2014)
Attracting Long‐Term Investors Through Integrated Thinking and Reporting: A Clinical Study of a Biopharmaceutical CompanyERN: Econometric Studies of Corporate Strategy
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Transient institutional ownership and CEO contractingThe Accounting Review, 84
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(2012)
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership, No. CGRP-42 -
Elyas Elyasiani (2008)
Institutional Ownership Stability and BHC PerformanceEntrepreneurship & Management eJournal
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Managers see the composition of their shareholders as an important determinant of their ability to resist short-term market pressures and to maximize firm intrinsic value -
(1998)
For the catering effect, see Francois Derrien, Ambrus Kecskés, and David Thesmar -
(2017)
Getting Along with BlackRock
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2018 Cantillon and Mann
- ISSN
- 1078-1196
- eISSN
- 1745-6622
- DOI
- 10.1111/jacf.12278
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements.
Journal
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2018