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EXPLAINING INTRAPERIOD ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE REPORTING OF CURRENCY TRANSLATION GAINS AND LOSSES

EXPLAINING INTRAPERIOD ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE REPORTING OF CURRENCY TRANSLATION GAINS AND LOSSES Abstract: Prior to the introduction of an Australian Accounting Standard relating to the treatment of foreign currency items, we find agreement among firms on the method of translating foreign subsidiaries' assets and liabilities, but no such agreement on the method of reporting the resulting gain or loss. The reporting choice represents an intraperiod accounting decision. We show that this choice is a function of the demand for ex ante optimal risk sharing agreements between management and shareholders, although auditor identity and firm size are also found to influence the choice of reporting method. We model the policy choice as both a dichotomous and a more finely graded three‐way problem, introducing to the accounting literature an experimental technique designed to test for the existence of any mutual dependence between alternatives. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

EXPLAINING INTRAPERIOD ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE REPORTING OF CURRENCY TRANSLATION GAINS AND LOSSES

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References (17)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 1990 Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-629X.1990.tb00108.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract: Prior to the introduction of an Australian Accounting Standard relating to the treatment of foreign currency items, we find agreement among firms on the method of translating foreign subsidiaries' assets and liabilities, but no such agreement on the method of reporting the resulting gain or loss. The reporting choice represents an intraperiod accounting decision. We show that this choice is a function of the demand for ex ante optimal risk sharing agreements between management and shareholders, although auditor identity and firm size are also found to influence the choice of reporting method. We model the policy choice as both a dichotomous and a more finely graded three‐way problem, introducing to the accounting literature an experimental technique designed to test for the existence of any mutual dependence between alternatives.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: May 1, 1990

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