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Epistemological Foundations for A Theology of Sin

Epistemological Foundations for A Theology of Sin HeyJ LVII (2016), pp. 553–567 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEOLOGY OF SIN ROBERT EGAN St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland The notion of sin presupposes the possibility of moral culpability, which in turn presupposes the possibility of moral knowledge. While this opening statement is somewhat obvious, its signifi- cance is reflected in the theological tradition’s distinction between mortal and venial sin; in par- ticular, the second, and vital criterion for establishing whether sin is mortal or venial: full knowledge. Without this knowledge, a knowledge born of ‘sufficient reflection,’ sin is not sin in the fullest sense of the term. Less obvious, to some at least, is the possibility of objective knowledge of the good. Philoso- phers such as J. L. Mackie and A. J. Ayer, to take just two examples, deny the possibility of objective moral knowledge, suggesting that there are no objective values (Mackie ), or that statements that contain judgements of value cannot be taken seriously as they are impossible to verify empirically (Ayer ). Such sceptical approaches to moral objectivity have important impli- cations for the theology of sin, as to assert the truth of either of the above (or similar) proposi- tions would be http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Heythrop Journal Wiley

Epistemological Foundations for A Theology of Sin

Egan, Robert
The Heythrop Journal , Volume 57 (3) – May 1, 2016
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References (12)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2016 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered
ISSN
0018-1196
eISSN
1468-2265
DOI
10.1111/heyj.12318
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

HeyJ LVII (2016), pp. 553–567 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEOLOGY OF SIN ROBERT EGAN St Patrick’s College, Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland The notion of sin presupposes the possibility of moral culpability, which in turn presupposes the possibility of moral knowledge. While this opening statement is somewhat obvious, its signifi- cance is reflected in the theological tradition’s distinction between mortal and venial sin; in par- ticular, the second, and vital criterion for establishing whether sin is mortal or venial: full knowledge. Without this knowledge, a knowledge born of ‘sufficient reflection,’ sin is not sin in the fullest sense of the term. Less obvious, to some at least, is the possibility of objective knowledge of the good. Philoso- phers such as J. L. Mackie and A. J. Ayer, to take just two examples, deny the possibility of objective moral knowledge, suggesting that there are no objective values (Mackie ), or that statements that contain judgements of value cannot be taken seriously as they are impossible to verify empirically (Ayer ). Such sceptical approaches to moral objectivity have important impli- cations for the theology of sin, as to assert the truth of either of the above (or similar) proposi- tions would be

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The Heythrop Journal – Wiley

Published: May 1, 2016

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