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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Accounting and Finance © 2021 AFAANZ
- ISSN
- 0810-5391
- eISSN
- 1467-629X
- DOI
- 10.1111/acfi.12728
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Using a sample of Chinese listed companies, we investigate the impact of anti‐takeover provisions (ATPs) on the cost of debt. The results show that ATPs increase the cost of debt, which is contrary to findings based on US data. Moreover, executive ownership enhances the positive relationship, while hiring a reputable auditor attenuates it, indicating an agency channel. We further examine the relation between agency costs and ATPs and confirm that ATPs aggravate agency costs, leading to detrimental effects for debt borrowers. Our findings are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity issues and other robustness checks.
Journal
Accounting & Finance – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2021
Keywords: Anti‐takeover provisions