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Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain

Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment‐cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non‐linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain

Accounting & Finance , Volume 49 (2) – Jun 1, 2009

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References (57)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 AFAANZ
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-629X.2008.00286.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment‐cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non‐linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: Jun 1, 2009

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