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DO BANK RELATIONSHIPS MATTER IN PUBLIC DEBT OFFERINGS?

DO BANK RELATIONSHIPS MATTER IN PUBLIC DEBT OFFERINGS? Finance theorists have argued that banks have a comparative advantage over public debtholders and other suppliers of debt both in gathering information about and in monitoring corporate borrowers. Although underwriters of public debt issues and private placements have access to inside information when executing specific transactions, commercial bankers have ongoing relationships with their corporate borrowers that have often been built up over years. Perhaps more important, banks are also often in a better position and have stronger incentives than a dispersed collection of bondholders to keep tabs on what the borrowers do after receiving the capital. This theoretical argument received striking empirical support from a study by Chris James published in 1987 in the Journal of Financial Economics. Entitled “Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans,” the study documented that announcements of new bank lending aggreements by public firms are received positively, on average (and in a large majority of cases) by the stock market. This finding offered a pointed contrast to the neutral to sharply negative stock‐price responses that accompany announcements of almost all other kinds of securities offerings, including private placements of debt and public offerings of straight debt. In this article, the authors discuss their own recently published study that provides another piece of evidence of the value added by banking relationships. Specifically, the authors report that the first public debt offerings of companies with bank relationships carry spreads that are 85 basis points less than the spreads of initial debt issues by comparable firms without bank relationships. As the authors interpret their findings, a banking relationship not only helps to “certify” the value of corporate borrowers to their stockholders, but also provides other lenders with valuable “cross‐monitoring” benefits that are reflected in lower borrowing costs. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Wiley

DO BANK RELATIONSHIPS MATTER IN PUBLIC DEBT OFFERINGS?

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References (12)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1078-1196
eISSN
1745-6622
DOI
10.1111/j.1745-6622.2000.tb00025.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Finance theorists have argued that banks have a comparative advantage over public debtholders and other suppliers of debt both in gathering information about and in monitoring corporate borrowers. Although underwriters of public debt issues and private placements have access to inside information when executing specific transactions, commercial bankers have ongoing relationships with their corporate borrowers that have often been built up over years. Perhaps more important, banks are also often in a better position and have stronger incentives than a dispersed collection of bondholders to keep tabs on what the borrowers do after receiving the capital. This theoretical argument received striking empirical support from a study by Chris James published in 1987 in the Journal of Financial Economics. Entitled “Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans,” the study documented that announcements of new bank lending aggreements by public firms are received positively, on average (and in a large majority of cases) by the stock market. This finding offered a pointed contrast to the neutral to sharply negative stock‐price responses that accompany announcements of almost all other kinds of securities offerings, including private placements of debt and public offerings of straight debt. In this article, the authors discuss their own recently published study that provides another piece of evidence of the value added by banking relationships. Specifically, the authors report that the first public debt offerings of companies with bank relationships carry spreads that are 85 basis points less than the spreads of initial debt issues by comparable firms without bank relationships. As the authors interpret their findings, a banking relationship not only helps to “certify” the value of corporate borrowers to their stockholders, but also provides other lenders with valuable “cross‐monitoring” benefits that are reflected in lower borrowing costs.

Journal

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley

Published: Jan 1, 2000

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