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Distracted institutional investors and audit risk

Distracted institutional investors and audit risk Using a newly developed institutional investor distraction measure, we examine whether auditors increase their risk assessment when clients’ institutional investors temporarily reduce their monitoring activities. We find that audit fees and audit report lags increase during periods when institutional investors temporarily focus their attention on other parts of their portfolio. This effect is stronger when dedicated institutional investors are distracted. We further show that the identified relationship is weaker in the post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Act period. Finally, we find that the impact of investor distraction on audit fees and lags is more pronounced for firms with weaker board oversight and higher discretionary accruals. Collectively, our results suggest that institutional shareholders’ monitoring activities benefit auditors by reducing audit risk. This paper also shows that the negative effect of investors’ limited attention on corporate monitoring can be somewhat mitigated by auditors. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

Distracted institutional investors and audit risk

Accounting & Finance , Volume 61 (3) – Sep 1, 2021

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References (54)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Accounting and Finance © 2021 AFAANZ
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/acfi.12718
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Using a newly developed institutional investor distraction measure, we examine whether auditors increase their risk assessment when clients’ institutional investors temporarily reduce their monitoring activities. We find that audit fees and audit report lags increase during periods when institutional investors temporarily focus their attention on other parts of their portfolio. This effect is stronger when dedicated institutional investors are distracted. We further show that the identified relationship is weaker in the post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Act period. Finally, we find that the impact of investor distraction on audit fees and lags is more pronounced for firms with weaker board oversight and higher discretionary accruals. Collectively, our results suggest that institutional shareholders’ monitoring activities benefit auditors by reducing audit risk. This paper also shows that the negative effect of investors’ limited attention on corporate monitoring can be somewhat mitigated by auditors.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2021

Keywords: Audit fee

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