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Corporate Leverage and Specialized Investments by Customers and Suppliers

Corporate Leverage and Specialized Investments by Customers and Suppliers A company's performance in the product market depends in part on the willingness of its suppliers and customers to invest in the relationship—to make specialized investments of human as well as financial capital that may have no value outside that relationship. Consistent with Stewart Myers's concept of debt overhang and underinvestment, the authors hypothesize that companies can encourage their suppliers and other key stakeholders to make such specialized investments by limiting their use of debt financing, thereby addressing their stakeholders' concerns about their long‐term performance and staying power. In this article, the authors report the findings of a recently published study of a sample of U.S. industrial companies during the period 1984‐2003. Using the benchmark input‐output accounts for the U.S. economy, the authors identified supplier and customer industries for each company in their sample while also collecting data on the firm's actual suppliers and customers from Compustat's segment files. Using empirical proxies for the intensity of specialized investments, they find that companies that operate in environments requiring specialized investments by suppliers and customers tend to operate with lower levels of debt. At the same time, the authors report evidence suggesting that the suppliers and customers of highly leveraged companies make lower levels of specialized investment than the suppliers and customers of less leveraged firms. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Wiley

Corporate Leverage and Specialized Investments by Customers and Suppliers

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References (1)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Morgan Stanley
ISSN
1078-1196
eISSN
1745-6622
DOI
10.1111/j.1745-6622.2008.00207.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A company's performance in the product market depends in part on the willingness of its suppliers and customers to invest in the relationship—to make specialized investments of human as well as financial capital that may have no value outside that relationship. Consistent with Stewart Myers's concept of debt overhang and underinvestment, the authors hypothesize that companies can encourage their suppliers and other key stakeholders to make such specialized investments by limiting their use of debt financing, thereby addressing their stakeholders' concerns about their long‐term performance and staying power. In this article, the authors report the findings of a recently published study of a sample of U.S. industrial companies during the period 1984‐2003. Using the benchmark input‐output accounts for the U.S. economy, the authors identified supplier and customer industries for each company in their sample while also collecting data on the firm's actual suppliers and customers from Compustat's segment files. Using empirical proxies for the intensity of specialized investments, they find that companies that operate in environments requiring specialized investments by suppliers and customers tend to operate with lower levels of debt. At the same time, the authors report evidence suggesting that the suppliers and customers of highly leveraged companies make lower levels of specialized investment than the suppliers and customers of less leveraged firms.

Journal

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley

Published: Sep 1, 2008

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