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CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit

CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit This study investigates the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and use of supplier‐provided trade credit. We provide evidence that CEO inside debt holdings are negatively related to the use of trade credit. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We exploit the final enforcement of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as an exogenous shock to inside debt holdings. Our difference‐in‐difference regression analysis establishes a causal relationship. In addition, we provide evidence that our documented results are not driven by omitted variable bias. We also employ instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity‐based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. Our cross‐sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit is more pronounced in firms with poor information environments and greater financing constraints. Overall, findings from our study suggest that CEO inside debt has important implications for the financing policy of the firm. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Accounting & Finance Wiley

CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit

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References (74)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Accounting and Finance © 2022 AFAANZ
ISSN
0810-5391
eISSN
1467-629X
DOI
10.1111/acfi.12901
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and use of supplier‐provided trade credit. We provide evidence that CEO inside debt holdings are negatively related to the use of trade credit. Our results are robust to the use of alternative regression estimation and alternative measures of key variables. We exploit the final enforcement of Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as an exogenous shock to inside debt holdings. Our difference‐in‐difference regression analysis establishes a causal relationship. In addition, we provide evidence that our documented results are not driven by omitted variable bias. We also employ instrumental variable regression estimation using heteroskedasticity‐based instruments to mitigate the endogeneity concern. Our cross‐sectional analyses reveal that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and trade credit is more pronounced in firms with poor information environments and greater financing constraints. Overall, findings from our study suggest that CEO inside debt has important implications for the financing policy of the firm.

Journal

Accounting & FinanceWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2022

Keywords: CEO inside debt; Executive compensation; Trade credit

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