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D. Hucker (2011)
Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France
C. Carrington (1962)
The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945. 4 volsInternational Affairs, 38
Mark Connelly (2004)
We can take it
Neville Jones (2012)
The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bomber Force 1923-1939
C. Krull, B. McKercher (2002)
The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary ObservationsDiplomacy & Statecraft, 13
J. Crang, P. Addison (2011)
Listening to Britain: Home Intelligence Reports on Britain's Finest Hour, May-September 1940
Mark Connelly (2002)
The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air Campaign against Germany, 1939-45Contemporary British History, 16
Home Opinion as shown in the Mails to U.S.A. and Eire
The Myth of the Blitz, p. 196. Cf. Smith, Britain and 1940
G. Bignami (2006)
Reaching for the starsNature, 441
Mark Connelly (2004)
We Can Take It! Britain and the memory of the Second World War
Rhetoric and Reality in Strategic Air Warfare
A. Grayling (2006)
Among the dead cities : was the Allied bombing of civilians in WWII a necessity or a crime?
L. Kitzan (1984)
Covenants Without the Sword: Public Opinion and British Defence Policy 1931–1935 Patrick Kyba Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983, pp. xiii, 218Canadian Journal of Political Science, 17
adopted a similar policy of bombing the civilian population of Germany?" 73 Among 2098 respondents, 46 per cent answered "yes" and the same share "no
Harrisson himself suggested something similar in 1941: Harrisson
(1984)
Circulation in 1939 was approximately 1.5 million. Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press
A public demand for reprisals?
J. Dukes (1998)
The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940: Corum, James S.: Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 378 pp., Publication Date: July 1997
In Britain, popular memory of the Blitz celebrates civilian resistance to the German bombing of London and other cities, emphasising positive values such as stoicism, humour and mutual aid. But the memory of such passive and defensive traits obscures the degree to which British civilian morale in 1940 depended on the belief that if Britain had to “take it”, then Germany was taking it as hard or harder. Contrary to the received historical account, opinion polls, Home Intelligence reports and newspaper letter columns show that a majority of the British supported the reprisal bombing of German civilians by Bomber Command. The wartime reprisals debate was the logical legacy of prewar assumptions about the overwhelming power of bombing; but it has been forgotten because it contradicts the myth of the Blitz.
Australian Journal of Politics and History – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2012
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