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BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF “SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION”

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF “SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION” The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk‐taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re‐duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Applied Corporate Finance Wiley

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF “SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION”

Hu, Henry T. C.
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance , Volume 9 (3) – Sep 1, 1996
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References (4)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1078-1196
eISSN
1745-6622
DOI
10.1111/j.1745-6622.1996.tb00297.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk‐taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re‐duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche.

Journal

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance – Wiley

Published: Sep 1, 1996

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