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Bayesian networks, Bayesian learning and cognitive development

Bayesian networks, Bayesian learning and cognitive development Introduction Over the past 30 years we have discovered an enormous amount about what children know and when they know it. But the real question for developmental cognitive science is not so much what children know, when they know it or even whether they learn it. The real question is how they learn it and why they get it right. Developmental ‘theory theorists’ (e.g. Carey, 1985 ; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997 ; Wellman & Gelman, 1998 ) have suggested that children's learning mechanisms are analogous to scientific theory‐formation. However, what we really need is a more precise computational specification of the mechanisms that underlie both types of learning, in cognitive development and scientific discovery. The most familiar candidates for learning mechanisms in developmental psychology have been variants of associationism, either the mechanisms of classical and operant conditioning in behaviorist theories (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972 ) or more recently, connectionist models (e.g. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986 ; Elman, Bates, Johnson & Karmiloff‐Smith, 1996 ; Shultz, 2003 ; Rogers & McClelland, 2004 ). Such theories have had difficulty explaining how apparently rich, complex, abstract, rule‐governed representations, such as we see in everyday theories, could be derived from evidence. Typically, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Developmental Science Wiley

Bayesian networks, Bayesian learning and cognitive development

Developmental Science , Volume 10 (3) – May 1, 2007

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References (64)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1363-755X
eISSN
1467-7687
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00584.x
pmid
17444969
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Introduction Over the past 30 years we have discovered an enormous amount about what children know and when they know it. But the real question for developmental cognitive science is not so much what children know, when they know it or even whether they learn it. The real question is how they learn it and why they get it right. Developmental ‘theory theorists’ (e.g. Carey, 1985 ; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997 ; Wellman & Gelman, 1998 ) have suggested that children's learning mechanisms are analogous to scientific theory‐formation. However, what we really need is a more precise computational specification of the mechanisms that underlie both types of learning, in cognitive development and scientific discovery. The most familiar candidates for learning mechanisms in developmental psychology have been variants of associationism, either the mechanisms of classical and operant conditioning in behaviorist theories (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972 ) or more recently, connectionist models (e.g. Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986 ; Elman, Bates, Johnson & Karmiloff‐Smith, 1996 ; Shultz, 2003 ; Rogers & McClelland, 2004 ). Such theories have had difficulty explaining how apparently rich, complex, abstract, rule‐governed representations, such as we see in everyday theories, could be derived from evidence. Typically,

Journal

Developmental ScienceWiley

Published: May 1, 2007

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