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An experimental investigation of the interaction effect of management training ground and reporting lines on internal auditors’ objectivity

An experimental investigation of the interaction effect of management training ground and... Seventy‐nine experienced internal auditors participated in an experiment investigating two factors that may affect internal auditors’ objectivity: (1) whether the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, and (2) whether the internal auditors’ reporting line is to management or the audit committee. Participants completed a case wherein management and the audit committee hold conflicting preferences regarding a major corporate investment opportunity. Participants evaluated relevant business risks and made an overall recommendation concerning the investment. The results include three important findings. First, we observe an interaction effect between management training ground and reporting line. When the internal audit function is not used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risks assessments do not significantly differ by reporting line. However, when the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risk assessments align with management's preferences when auditors report to senior management versus the audit committee. Second, when the internal audit function is a management training ground, internal auditors provide more favorable investment recommendations (i.e., consistent with management's preferences). Third, internal auditors unexpectedly provided more favorable recommendations to the audit committee than to management. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Journal of Auditing Wiley

An experimental investigation of the interaction effect of management training ground and reporting lines on internal auditors’ objectivity

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ISSN
1090-6738
eISSN
1099-1123
DOI
10.1111/ijau.12110
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Seventy‐nine experienced internal auditors participated in an experiment investigating two factors that may affect internal auditors’ objectivity: (1) whether the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, and (2) whether the internal auditors’ reporting line is to management or the audit committee. Participants completed a case wherein management and the audit committee hold conflicting preferences regarding a major corporate investment opportunity. Participants evaluated relevant business risks and made an overall recommendation concerning the investment. The results include three important findings. First, we observe an interaction effect between management training ground and reporting line. When the internal audit function is not used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risks assessments do not significantly differ by reporting line. However, when the internal audit function is used as a management training ground, internal auditors’ risk assessments align with management's preferences when auditors report to senior management versus the audit committee. Second, when the internal audit function is a management training ground, internal auditors provide more favorable investment recommendations (i.e., consistent with management's preferences). Third, internal auditors unexpectedly provided more favorable recommendations to the audit committee than to management.

Journal

International Journal of AuditingWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2018

Keywords: ; ; ;

References