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Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) offers a new solution concept in game theory. This paper explores its application to a range of simple gambling games, enabling comparison with minimax solutions for similar problems. We find that ARA has several attractive advantages: it is easier to compute, it takes account of asymmetric information, it corresponds better to human behavior, and it reduces to previous solutions in appropriate circumstances. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2011
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