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A COMMENT ON KLIEVE‐MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME

A COMMENT ON KLIEVE‐MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME Klieve and MacAulay (1993) (KM) analyse bargaining between the Australian and Japanese Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) industries using game theory. The KM model is a Nash equilibrium with symmetrical information, threat functions and a set of biological constraints. When we attempted to include the New Zealand SBT industry as a player in the KM model, we discovered important shortcomings in it. In this comment, we outline three major shortcomings in the KM model and propose an alternative model of a Nash equilibrium for the SBT industry. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Australian Journal of Agricultural Resource Economics Wiley

A COMMENT ON KLIEVE‐MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME

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References (2)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1995 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1364-985X
eISSN
1467-8489
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-8489.1995.tb00555.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Klieve and MacAulay (1993) (KM) analyse bargaining between the Australian and Japanese Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) industries using game theory. The KM model is a Nash equilibrium with symmetrical information, threat functions and a set of biological constraints. When we attempted to include the New Zealand SBT industry as a player in the KM model, we discovered important shortcomings in it. In this comment, we outline three major shortcomings in the KM model and propose an alternative model of a Nash equilibrium for the SBT industry.

Journal

The Australian Journal of Agricultural Resource Economics – Wiley

Published: Dec 1, 1995

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