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Monopsony in the Labor Market: New Empirical Results and New Public Policies

Monopsony in the Labor Market: New Empirical Results and New Public Policies Monopsony in the Labor Market New Empirical Results and New Public Policies Orley Ashenfelter David Card Henry Farber Michael R. Ransom The idea that firms have some market power in wage-setting has been slow to gain acceptance in economics. Indeed, until relatively recently, the textbooks viewed monopsony power as either a theoretical curiosum, or a concept limited to a handful of company towns in the past. This view has been changing rapidly, driven by a combination of theoretical innovations, empirical findings, dramatic legal cases, and new data sets that make it possible to measure the degree of market power in different ways. A search of the EconLit database shows that the number of published journal articles mentioning “monopsony” rose from only two in the 1980s to 20 in the 1990s, 32 in the 2000s, and to 64 in the 2010s. This volume contains a set of 11 papers originally presented at the Sundance Con- ference on Monopsony in Labor Markets, organized by three of us (Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom). Together the papers offer a rich perspective on the current state of research on market power in the labor market. Four of the papers use the framework pioneered by Manning http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Human Resources University of Wisconsin Press

Monopsony in the Labor Market: New Empirical Results and New Public Policies

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Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press
Copyright
Copyright © Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
ISSN
1548-8004

Abstract

Monopsony in the Labor Market New Empirical Results and New Public Policies Orley Ashenfelter David Card Henry Farber Michael R. Ransom The idea that firms have some market power in wage-setting has been slow to gain acceptance in economics. Indeed, until relatively recently, the textbooks viewed monopsony power as either a theoretical curiosum, or a concept limited to a handful of company towns in the past. This view has been changing rapidly, driven by a combination of theoretical innovations, empirical findings, dramatic legal cases, and new data sets that make it possible to measure the degree of market power in different ways. A search of the EconLit database shows that the number of published journal articles mentioning “monopsony” rose from only two in the 1980s to 20 in the 1990s, 32 in the 2000s, and to 64 in the 2010s. This volume contains a set of 11 papers originally presented at the Sundance Con- ference on Monopsony in Labor Markets, organized by three of us (Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom). Together the papers offer a rich perspective on the current state of research on market power in the labor market. Four of the papers use the framework pioneered by Manning

Journal

Journal of Human ResourcesUniversity of Wisconsin Press

Published: Mar 29, 2022

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