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Representation on the Periphery: The Past and Future of Nonvoting Members of Congress

Representation on the Periphery: The Past and Future of Nonvoting Members of Congress Nonvoting representatives, representing American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Washington, DC, inhabit a peripheral space within the US Congress. House rules bar them from voting on the floor, their authority derives not from the Constitution but from statute, and the office they hold can be revoked at the whims of Congress. Drawing on original archival research, this article sketches out three justifications given for this institution: that nonvoting members would increase information flows to the legislature, that they would incorporate peripheral territory prior to statehood, and that they would empower members to use tools besides voting to exercise political power. It then evaluates the normative status of nonvoting representation in democratic theory, arguing that representation without voting is incongruent with notions of consent and equal power required for democratic self-rule. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Political Thought University of Chicago Press

Representation on the Periphery: The Past and Future of Nonvoting Members of Congress

American Political Thought , Volume 10 (3): 29 – Jun 1, 2021

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References (113)

Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Copyright
© 2021 by The Jack Miller Center. All rights reserved.
ISSN
2161-1580
eISSN
2161-1599
DOI
10.1086/715010
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Nonvoting representatives, representing American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Washington, DC, inhabit a peripheral space within the US Congress. House rules bar them from voting on the floor, their authority derives not from the Constitution but from statute, and the office they hold can be revoked at the whims of Congress. Drawing on original archival research, this article sketches out three justifications given for this institution: that nonvoting members would increase information flows to the legislature, that they would incorporate peripheral territory prior to statehood, and that they would empower members to use tools besides voting to exercise political power. It then evaluates the normative status of nonvoting representation in democratic theory, arguing that representation without voting is incongruent with notions of consent and equal power required for democratic self-rule.

Journal

American Political ThoughtUniversity of Chicago Press

Published: Jun 1, 2021

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