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Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia

Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia AbstractSeth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its target, because it only accounts for a lack of objecthood. Enactive theory is better suited to explain concurrents’ lack of subjectivity veridicality. The world itself shapes experience only during veridical perception. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Cognitive Neuroscience Taylor & Francis

Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia

Froese, Tom
Cognitive Neuroscience , Volume 5 (2): 2 – Apr 3, 2014
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Steps toward an enactive account of synesthesia

Abstract

AbstractSeth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its...
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
ISSN
1758-8936
eISSN
1758-8928
DOI
10.1080/17588928.2014.905521
pmid
24720582
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractSeth extends predictive processing with counterfactuals: Encoded probabilities of what would occur given a repertoire of possible (but unexecuted) actions. He thereby provides a neat mathematical formulation of the sensorimotor account of perceptual presence, i.e., of the fact that we perceive a whole object while being limited to seeing it from a perspective. Synesthetic concurrents are explained in terms of impoverished counterfactuals. I argue that this explanation misses its target, because it only accounts for a lack of objecthood. Enactive theory is better suited to explain concurrents’ lack of subjectivity veridicality. The world itself shapes experience only during veridical perception.

Journal

Cognitive Neuroscience – Taylor & Francis

Published: Apr 3, 2014

References

  • Phenomenology and embodied action
  • The brain is not an isolated “black box,” nor is its goal to become one
  • Locked-in syndrome: A challenge for embodied cognitive science
  • Dreaming the whole cat: Generative models, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception of perceptual experience
  • An extended case study on the phenomenology of spatial sequence synaesthesia
  • A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synaesthesia