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Rorty's pragmatism: Argument and experience

Rorty's pragmatism: Argument and experience orty's work is significant in its attempt Rto recover some of the strongest argu- ments in a rather neglected strand of Anglo- American philosophy - arguments dealing with the central issues of modem philosophy. He returns, in particular, to the work of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who developed the school of thought michael reid known as pragmatism. For Rorty, a recon- sideration of the work of this school is one way of coming to see the error of the 'grad- ual return [in the last two decades] to sys- RORTY'S tematic attempts to solve traditional [philo- sophical] problems* (Rorty, 1991: 3). The PRAGMATIS M attempt to solve these traditional problems involves looking for a foundational theory, argument securing, in the first instance, our claim to knowledge.- Taking the and experience work of Michael Dummett as representa- tive, Rorty notes tion of a consistently anti-foundationalist Dummett's insistence pragmatism. My criticism concerns the way that philosophy identify a in which Rorty's pragmatism leaves us with foundation in something the idea of apparently free-floating language transcending the contin- games. The problem does not concern the gencies of our discourse loss of metaphysical realism (the loss of the and our http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities Taylor & Francis

Rorty's pragmatism: Argument and experience

Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities , Volume 1 (3): 11 – Jan 1, 1996

Rorty's pragmatism: Argument and experience

Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities , Volume 1 (3): 11 – Jan 1, 1996

Abstract

orty's work is significant in its attempt Rto recover some of the strongest argu- ments in a rather neglected strand of Anglo- American philosophy - arguments dealing with the central issues of modem philosophy. He returns, in particular, to the work of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who developed the school of thought michael reid known as pragmatism. For Rorty, a recon- sideration of the work of this school is one way of coming to see the error of the 'grad- ual return [in the last two decades] to sys- RORTY'S tematic attempts to solve traditional [philo- sophical] problems* (Rorty, 1991: 3). The PRAGMATIS M attempt to solve these traditional problems involves looking for a foundational theory, argument securing, in the first instance, our claim to knowledge.- Taking the and experience work of Michael Dummett as representa- tive, Rorty notes tion of a consistently anti-foundationalist Dummett's insistence pragmatism. My criticism concerns the way that philosophy identify a in which Rorty's pragmatism leaves us with foundation in something the idea of apparently free-floating language transcending the contin- games. The problem does not concern the gencies of our discourse loss of metaphysical realism (the loss of the and our

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References (3)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1469-2899
eISSN
0969-725X
DOI
10.1080/09697259608571902
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

orty's work is significant in its attempt Rto recover some of the strongest argu- ments in a rather neglected strand of Anglo- American philosophy - arguments dealing with the central issues of modem philosophy. He returns, in particular, to the work of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, who developed the school of thought michael reid known as pragmatism. For Rorty, a recon- sideration of the work of this school is one way of coming to see the error of the 'grad- ual return [in the last two decades] to sys- RORTY'S tematic attempts to solve traditional [philo- sophical] problems* (Rorty, 1991: 3). The PRAGMATIS M attempt to solve these traditional problems involves looking for a foundational theory, argument securing, in the first instance, our claim to knowledge.- Taking the and experience work of Michael Dummett as representa- tive, Rorty notes tion of a consistently anti-foundationalist Dummett's insistence pragmatism. My criticism concerns the way that philosophy identify a in which Rorty's pragmatism leaves us with foundation in something the idea of apparently free-floating language transcending the contin- games. The problem does not concern the gencies of our discourse loss of metaphysical realism (the loss of the and our

Journal

Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical HumanitiesTaylor & Francis

Published: Jan 1, 1996

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