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Institutional Differences and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Property Tax Assessment Quality

Institutional Differences and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Property Tax Assessment... AbstractThis article examines the relationship between institutional differences embedded in local governance structures and government performance in the specific context of property assessment. In order to provide deeper insight into why certain governance structures perform better than others, we focus on the impact of nested levels of institutions—constitutional-level and substantive-level rules of governance—beyond the conventional perspective of the form of government. Based on panel data of cities and towns in New York State between 1993 and 2010, our analysis indicates that, among other institutional arrangements, municipalities employing the council–manager form with appointed assessors are most likely to achieve higher levels of assessment quality (uniformity) of the residential property. This indicates that having politically independent (more career-oriented), low-powered appointed governance structures rather than politically risk-averse (more voter-oriented), high-powered elected counterparts are more likely to be effective at reducing risk in tax equity issues, thus providing better financial performance. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Public Performance & Management Review Taylor & Francis

Institutional Differences and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Property Tax Assessment Quality

Institutional Differences and Local Government Performance: Evidence from Property Tax Assessment Quality

Public Performance & Management Review , Volume 43 (2): 26 – Mar 3, 2020

Abstract

AbstractThis article examines the relationship between institutional differences embedded in local governance structures and government performance in the specific context of property assessment. In order to provide deeper insight into why certain governance structures perform better than others, we focus on the impact of nested levels of institutions—constitutional-level and substantive-level rules of governance—beyond the conventional perspective of the form of government. Based on panel data of cities and towns in New York State between 1993 and 2010, our analysis indicates that, among other institutional arrangements, municipalities employing the council–manager form with appointed assessors are most likely to achieve higher levels of assessment quality (uniformity) of the residential property. This indicates that having politically independent (more career-oriented), low-powered appointed governance structures rather than politically risk-averse (more voter-oriented), high-powered elected counterparts are more likely to be effective at reducing risk in tax equity issues, thus providing better financial performance.

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References (64)

Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
© 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1557-9271
eISSN
1530-9576
DOI
10.1080/15309576.2019.1627223
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractThis article examines the relationship between institutional differences embedded in local governance structures and government performance in the specific context of property assessment. In order to provide deeper insight into why certain governance structures perform better than others, we focus on the impact of nested levels of institutions—constitutional-level and substantive-level rules of governance—beyond the conventional perspective of the form of government. Based on panel data of cities and towns in New York State between 1993 and 2010, our analysis indicates that, among other institutional arrangements, municipalities employing the council–manager form with appointed assessors are most likely to achieve higher levels of assessment quality (uniformity) of the residential property. This indicates that having politically independent (more career-oriented), low-powered appointed governance structures rather than politically risk-averse (more voter-oriented), high-powered elected counterparts are more likely to be effective at reducing risk in tax equity issues, thus providing better financial performance.

Journal

Public Performance & Management ReviewTaylor & Francis

Published: Mar 3, 2020

Keywords: assessment uniformity; assessor type; local governance structure; nested institutions; property tax

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