Abstract
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 2019, VOL. 11, NO. 2, 154–171 https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2019.1604526 ARTICLE Hunting for tonnage: waste workers’ incentives in a public-private partnership in Bafoussam, Cameroon Rolande Christelle Makamté Kakeu–Tardy and René Véron Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, Géopolis UNIL-Mouline, Lausanne, Switzerland ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Received 19 April 2018 Public-private partnerships are often depicted as an effective institutional arrange- Accepted 13 March 2019 ment to improve urban services towards sustainable development. In sub-Saharan Africa, the involvement of private parties in municipal solid waste management is KEYWORDS believed to bring in technical, managerial and financial capabilities, which munici- Public-private partnerships; palities generally lack. However, several studies revealed that access to privatised solid waste management; waste collection services is often unequal and disfavouring unplanned settlements. environmental justice; This research contributes to an understanding of the production of such socio- incentives; sub-Saharan Africa spatial inequalities and injustices through public-private partnerships by specifically looking at the everyday collection practices of formal waste workers employed by Hysacam, the private company in charge of waste management services in the medium-sized city of Bafoussam and elsewhere in Cameroon. Drawing primarily upon qualitative data, including participant observation, the paper shows how the weight-based collection target, prescribed in the tripartite partnership contract between the central government, the municipality and Hysacam that theoretically should cover the whole urban area, produced perverse incentives at various scales for uneven garbage collection in Bafoussam. More generally, this case study points to the importance of considering workers and their everyday practices, as well as incentives and accountabilities, for the design of sustainable and socially just solid waste management. 1. Introduction However, an increasing number of African cities have started to improve waste collection. Since the Solid waste management is primarily a problem of mid-1980, there has also been an increased involve- urban areas affecting all three pillars of sustainable ment of the private sector in urban service delivery development. Poorly managed solid waste contam- (Ahmed and Ali 2006). Public-private partnerships, in inates the environment (water, soil, air) at local and particular, tend to be seen by international donors global scales, has negative social impacts on human and policymakers as a preferable alternative to both health and hygiene of communities and waste work- municipality-run systems and uncontrolled competi- ers, and affects economic productivity and the attrac- tion between private firms. Indeed, public-private tiveness of places (Kaza et al. 2018). According to partnerships often important improvements in a recent World Bank report, sub-Saharan Africa, in household waste collection, as an abundant litera- part due to its rapid urbanization rates, is the region ture reports (Post et al. 2003; Ahmed and Ali 2006; with the fastest growth rate in waste production, Mohan et al. 2016; Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2016). estimated to triple between 2016 and 2050 (Kaza However, many public-private partnerships, particu- et al. 2018). This represent a formidable challenge larly those with transnational companies, have been for the region, where the majority of waste is openly a failure in sub-Saharan Africa (Kaza et al. 2018). dumped today. CONTACT Rolande Christelle Makamté Kakeu–Tardy rolandechristelle.tardy@unil.ch Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, Géopolis UNIL-Mouline, Lausanne CH-1015, Switzerland © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 155 Cameroon represents an interesting case, where but by the state, as it is the case in Bafoussam. This the privatisation of municipal solid waste manage- paper, therefore, needs to look beyond direct eco- ment goes back to the late 1960s and is dominated nomic incentives for waste workers to examine more by a single national company; that is, Hysacam complex institutional incentives at different scales (Hygiene and Sanitation of Cameroon). Public- within the public-private partnership for an explana- private partnerships with Hysacam have been tion of uneven waste collection. To do this, we expanding gradually since the 1990s; since the mid- address three questions: (1) What are the terms of 2000s, they have been extended to medium-sized reference and the obligations of Hysacam and its cities, where the majority of the country’s and the workers within the public-private partnership in region’s urban population lives. Unlike in many pri- Bafoussam city? (2) How do these rules of the public- vatised systems elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, private partnership influence the waste collection where the costs of solid waste management are practices on the ground, in both planned and covered by user fees, Hysacam has since its begin- unplanned neighbourhoods? (3) What are the out- nings been paid directly by the state at a rate that is comes in terms of household waste collection and based on the weight (‘tonnage’) of waste collected socio-spatial and environmental justice? and transported to the municipal landfill. After this introduction, section 2 reviews the lit- This study examines this relatively enduring system erature on the privatisation of solid waste manage- at the case of the medium-sized city of Bafoussam and ment in sub-Saharan Africa and describes the with a focus on (unequal) household collection ser- development of partnerships with Hysacam in vices. Garbage collection is generally seen as one of Cameroon. Section 3 describes the methodology, the most problematic steps in solid waste management including the experiences with participant observa- in developing countries (Kassim and Ali 2006); it is tion of/with formal waste workers employed by closely linked to environmental injustices, as collection Hysacam. Section 4 provides necessary contextual rates vary between and within cities generally affecting information on the city of Bafoussam and its waste poor residents of unplanned settlements dispropor- management, including the techniques and equip- tionally (Baabereyir et al. 2012). Indeed, numerous stu- ment used by Hysacam. Section 5 forms the empirical dies have pointed to public-private partnerships as core part of the paper and addresses the three a source of increasing environmental inequalities research questions. It describes the institutional (Fahmi 2005; Guerrero et al. 2013). In order to explain arrangements of the public-private partnership, ana- this process, most of the studies have focused on the lyses the incentives leading to a ‘garbage hunt’ in the design of the contractual arrangements, the responsi- everyday waste collection and depicts the socio- bilities and (monitoring) capacities of the public sector, spatial outcomes in different, planned and people’s awareness and the varying urban topography, unplanned, neighbourhoods of Bafoussam. In section morphology and infrastructure (e.g. largely inaccessible 6, we discuss our findings in relation to existing roads) (Awortwi 2004;Ahmed andAli 2006;Baabereyir studies and reflect on the incentive system in place et al. 2012; Oteng-Ababio et al. 2013;Yeboah-Assiamah at different levels. In the conclusions (section 7), we et al. 2016). Interestingly, relatively little attention has synthesize the main arguments of the paper and been given to factors lying with the private partners, brieflyreflect on alternative partnership arrange- the waste collectors on the ground and their economic ments and waste collection systems that could cor- and institutional incentives for (non-) collection in par- rect perverse incentives to waste workers and reduce ticular areas. Against this trend, some case studies on socio-spatial inequalities and environmental waste collection systems based on user fees showed injustices. that private contractors and collectors had a preference for high income areas where the households were able to afford to pay for frequent door-to-door collection 2. Literature review (Kassim and Ali 2006; Mbeng et al. 2009; Ezebilo and 2.1 Privatisation of waste management in Animasaun 2011; Tilaye and van Dijk 2014). sub-Saharan Africa However, little is known about (uneven) collection practices where private companies and formal waste Private companies for waste management emerged workers are not paid through household user fees in sub-Saharan African cities after the independence 156 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON period of the 1960s and particularly in the 1980s in franchising and competitive bidding arrangements, the context of structural adjustment programs on the one hand, where the private partners collect (Awortwi 2004; Sory and Tallet 2015). By the late user fees, and contracting-out systems, where 2000s, some form of privatisation of urban service a public agency pays the private contractors by delivery existed in at least 93 countries globally, weight of collected garbage (as in Bafoussam, and including many Sub-Saharan African countries in Cameroon more generally). Some authors consider (Kirama and Mayo 2016), although there is a recent the local and national governments as the most trend in the region toward stronger involvement of relevant stakeholders in public-private partnerships, the national state in waste management (Kaza et al. as they are not only accountable regulators but also 2018). responsible for the enabling environment, in particu- Both exogenous and endogenous reasons lar the road network, transportation facilities and prompted African states to gradually privatise urban people’s awareness raising (Guerrero et al. 2013). services, including municipal solid waste manage- Other authors underline the importance of people’s ment (Post et al. 2003). The main exogenous factor participation in solid waste management and the were the structural adjustment programs that pro- collaboration with (informal) micro-enterprises in moted, amongst other measures, privatisation in public-private-people partnerships, particularly to response to the problematic economic situation of ensure waste collection in unplanned settlements sub-Saharan African countries and cities (Kirama and (Tilaye and van Dijk 2014; McKay et al. 2015; Kirama Mayo 2016). For instance, waste collection in the city and Mayo 2016). of Accra in Ghana was privatised during the 1980s, when budgetary cuts were imposed to the govern- 2.2 Experiences with public-private partnerships ment by the IMF and the World Bank (Post et al. in solid waste collection 2003). As for the internal factors, unprecedented rapid urbanisation represented a new challenge for Several studies have indicated that public-private local governments and their waste management that partnerships can improve the coverage, efficiency could not be met by their existing technical, institu- and effectiveness of waste collection if pertinent pro- tional and financial capacities (Ogu 2000; Post et al. viders are included and if the institutional design and 2003; Ngnikam and Tanawa 2006; Oteng-Ababio the technologies are adapted to the local context of et al. 2013). the developing city (Post and Obirih-Opareh 2003; However, disappointing experiences with unregu- Ahmed and Ali 2004; Kapoor 2016; Yeboah- lated and full privatisation, together with a general Assiamah et al. 2016). The latter authors underline trend toward public-private partnerships since the the importance of the vertical integration of small- 1990s, have encouraged governments to shift toward scale operators and the public sector, as well as of this latter model of privatisation. In such public- incentives for both public and private actors accruing private partnerships, power and responsibilities are from the particular terms of reference of the partner- shared between the state (most often the local muni- ship. The inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised cipality) and the private company, whereby the state people involved in waste collection optimises part- acts as the regulator and the company as the service nership arrangements while creating new employ- provider. Accordingly, the public sector remains an ment opportunities (Ahmed and Ali 2004; Fahmi accountable stakeholder for the waste service deliv- 2005; Kassim and Ali 2006; Tilaye and van Dijk 2014; ery of the contracted private actor(s) (Awortwi 2004). Ngambi 2016). As the efficiency and equity of public- The (re-)integration of municipalities into systems of private partnerships are dependent on institutional urban service provision was to ensure more sustain- designs, incentives, popular participation and other able and equitable systems (Jaglin 2014). State actors local factors, research and advocacy are required so may play varying roles in such partnerships: from the that the theoretical benefits of partnerships can be simple enforcement of user fees and the general translated into ground realities (Ahmed and Ali oversight and regulation of private contractors, to 2004). the provision of particular services along the waste However, Awortwi (2004) found that the results chain (e.g. collection, transport or processing). from public-private partnerships in three Ghanaian Awortwi (2004), furthermore, distinguishes between cities did not match the theoretical and policy INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 157 expectations. The public actors failed to consider key cleanliness. At the same time, non-payment of user institutional factors required for effective waste col- fees and increased competition between multiple lection under public-private partnerships, that is, the operators reduce the profitability and the attractive- setting up of a system of competitive bidding, the ness of the solid waste sector for private contractors clear definition and division of the roles between the (Sory and Tallet 2015). The reviewed literature public regulator and the private service provider, the remains silent as to whether municipalities actually capacity of local governments to effectively monitor take their contractual responsibility to enforce house- the private party and to apply sanctions (see also hold payments to private contractors, but Sory and Post et al. 2003; Oteng-Ababio et al. 2013). As Tallet (2015) point to political disincentives to do so. a consequence, the systems were in poor condition According to Ahmed and Ali (2006), however, (poor) and struggling with financial deficiency. people would be willing to pay for the service if they In Accra, furthermore, the public-private partner- were considered as partners in solid waste manage- ship brought in foreign technology, including sophis- ment. Furthermore, substantive people’sparticipation ticated compactor garbage trucks designed for in solid waste management is seen as a necessary con- developed cities, that proved inappropriate for deal- dition to improve the accountability and responsive- ing with the local waste conditions (Oteng-Ababio ness of private companies in public-private et al. 2013). Imported technologies, whether used in partnerships (Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2016). The same a public or in a privatised system, often reinforce the authors also point to the complexity of socio-political underservicing of poor areas. In particular, large gar- aspects that can put the success of public-private part- bage trucks are not suitable for the narrow roads in nerships at risk, for example, when decisions on landfill unplanned settlements (Kirama and Mayo 2016). sites have to be taken. Again, people’s participation, in Compactor systems are less effective in developing form of their consultation in meetings with politicians, cities, where household garbage is mostly composed is seen as a potential solution. of organic waste, which is hardly compactable. In general, existing studies have focused on the Other studies pointed to the households as a key important role of the (local) state and of people’s stakeholder in waste collection and their limited will- participation for the functioning of solid waste collec- ingness (resulting to some extent from the lack of tion under public-private partnerships. Comparatively awareness) and their limited capacity to pay for the little attention has been paid to the private companies service (Ezebilo and Animasaun 2011; Kaseva and and particularly to the incentives for their workers to Mbuligwe 2005; Kassim and Ali 2006; Post et al. collect waste (from particular household and particu- 2003; Tilaye and van Dijk 2014). In Dar es Salaam, lar neighbourhoods). Furthermore, most studies for example, franchised private companies were dis- examined public-private partnerships based on user couraged to work in poor neighbourhoods where fee fees that seem to be more widespread in sub-Saharan collection rates were lower than in high-income areas Africa than the contracting-out system prevalent in (Kirama and Mayo 2016). In Accra, neighbourhood- Cameroon. Finally, few studies (some of which have differentiated collection fees, including the free col- been cited above) exist that analyse the performance lection of garbage in the poorest planned settle- of public-private partnerships in terms of socially and ments, were introduced with the aim to reduce spatially equitable collection and thus their effects on spatial injustices. However, collection became highly environmental justice. irregular in these areas resulting in the underservi- cing of poorer settlements and even implying the 2.3. The emergence of public-private partnerships subsidization of regular door-to-door garbage collec- in Cameroon tion in better-off neighbourhoods (Baabereyir et al. Cameroon seems to be among the first sub-Saharan 2012). Non-payment of user fees, particularly by poor countries to involve private contractors and to intro- households, led to wastes remaining (visible) in the duce public-private partnerships in municipal waste neighbourhoods and therefore to a general dissatis- management. Its gradual privatisation of the munici- faction with privatised waste management systems pal solid waste sector is closely linked to Hysacam, (Ogu 2000; Kassim and Ali 2006). Uneven willingness the by far most important private waste manage- and capacity to pay for waste services also contrib- ment company in Cameroon with operations in 17 uted to intra-city disparities in waste collection and cities in the country and in some other sub-Saharan 158 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON African countries, including Benin, Liberia, Niger and Despite the relatively long history of private-sector Chad (Hysacam : L’histoire d’Hysacam 2017). involvement in Cameroon’s solid waste management, Hysacam was founded in Douala as a subsidiary relatively few studies exist on this issue. In a blog, the of the French Grandjouan Group in 1969. Starting director of Hysacam proclaimed that the company was with a dozen (imported) trucks and more than 100 efficient in having improved the cleanliness of the employees, including some Western managers, the metropolitan areas of Cameroun (29 October 2012 company had the necessary technical equipment posting by J.-P. Ymélé to Secteur Privé & and human resources to replace the municipality Développement blog ; unreferenced). In a more in providing and improving waste management nuanced study, Parrot et al. (2009) showed how physi- services in Douala, a fast-growing city of about cal factors (distance, inaccessibility) and livelihood see- 500,000 inhabitants at the time (Hysacam : kers influence Hysacam’s waste collection system L’histoire d’Hysacam 2017). In 1979, Hysacam under the public-private partnership in the hilly city of expanded its operations to the political capital of Yaoundé. Here, a range of other actors, including NGOs Yaoundé, but the company’snear-monopoly in and CBOs, fill the gap in marginalised and inaccessible managing the solid wastes of the two capital cities areas. The authors suggest that Hysacam and the muni- was challenged in the 1980s. Structural adjustment cipal authorities should develop or reinforce partner- ledtoaneconomiccrisisand thederegulationsaw ships with those stakeholders and clearly define their many smaller companies, as well as community- respective roles. In a similar vein, McKay et al. (2015)call based organisations, enter the waste sector for a multi-stakeholder approach in Douala, where solid (Hysacam : L’histoire d’Hysacam 2017). Due to dis- waste management faces challenges due to increasing appointing experiences with unregulated privatisa- waste volumes and disposal costs while the municipal tion, Hysacam was able to re-establish itself in the financial capacity remains limited. They see a need to 1990sasthe dominant privatewaste serviceprovi- formally involve informal recyclers, micro-enterprises, der under exclusive public-private partnerships in businesses, NGOs and CBOs in a larger partnership. the two capital cities. Collection methods were Furthermore, Manga et al. (2008) found that multiple further modernised with the introduction of gar- levels of government – national ministries and the bage trucks used for door-to-door collection and three local communes – have poorly defined and over- the so-called ampliroll (trucks to pick up the bins at lapping responsibilities in the waste management of collection points). A formally employed, skilled and the small touristic city of Limbé. This led to the ineffi- effective workforce drives these trucks and collects cient use of both human and capital resources and the rubbish. In 2007, Hysacam also entered poor waste management. Some researchers also inves- a contractual arrangement with the French multi- tigated technical aspects and environmental impacts of national Veolia Propreté (Hysacam : L’histoire waste management in Cameroon. For example, poor d’Hysacam 2017). Today, Hysacam’sservices recovery and disposal practices were outlined as a main include the collection and transportation of solid problem in the country’swaste management system wastes produced by households, the cleaning and (Manga et al. 2008; McKay et al. 2015; 29 October 2012 sweeping of streets, squares and markets, and the posting by J.-P. Ymélé to Secteur Privé & operation of engineered treatment and disposal Développement blog. See note 2). facilities. According to its website, Hysacam has By focusing on waste collection in Bafoussam, this more than 5,000 employees and over 500 garbage paper contributes to the empirical literature on solid trucks. It operates several landfills and two biogas waste management under public-private partnerships capture and treatment plants (Hysacam : L’histoire in Cameroon by extending the discussion beyond the d’Hysacam 2017). The success of Hysacam in the capital cities of Yaoundé and Douala. It furthermore metropolitan cities has encouraged its extension to complements the existing studies by analysing the medium-sized cities since 2006, first to Bafoussam, causes of spatial inequalities and environmental injus- Limbé and Kribi, and this with the support of inter- tices in waste collection in more depth and with a focus national partners, notably the European Union on the understudied public-private partnerships based (Hysacam : L’histoire d’Hysacam 2017). weight-dependent public payment systems. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 159 3. Methodology Another five interviews were carried out with zonal work supervisors who conduct field inspections. The Empirical data presented in this paper originated length of the interview sessions varied from 30 min- from 7.5 months of fieldwork in 2014–15 and in utes to one hour. The first author was often sponta- 2016 in Bafoussam as part of a larger study on solid neously introduced from one interviewee to the next. waste management by the first author. The paper Tape recording was therefore seen as too intrusive draws primarily on data collected through qualitative and most times only notes were taken during the methods, including semi structured interviews and interview and written up later from the field journal. participant observation. First and foremost, however, the internships served In order to acquire data on the public-private part- to engage in participant observation with Hysacam’s nership (research question 1) and to get access to local waste worker teams, each comprising a driver and two key informants, a 3-week internship was organised with or three waste collectors, and to study their concrete the municipality (Urban Community of Bafoussam). waste collection practices and motivations (research During this time, the key municipal officer in charge question 2). Each of the 15 garbage collection teams of sanitation, including waste management, as well as was accompanied two or three times on their seven- four other local experts were interviewed on the history hour tour along the streets and through the neighbour- and the organisation of the city’s solid waste manage- hoods during which numerous informal conversations ment. These interviews took place in the municipality’s took place, particularly with the drivers. About 40 of office space and lasted about two hours each. There these conversations were recorded in the cabin of the were no further people with in-depth knowledge on garbage truck; important passages were later tran- waste management available during the time of the scribed. The first author being a woman, it was only internship. Furthermore, the municipal archives were rarely possible to physically take part in collecting searched for information on the partnership contract, waste, the workers stating that ‘this is not a woman’s expenses on solid waste management, etc. work’. Similarly, the population regarded her as Already during the initial phase of the fieldwork, Hysacam office staff rather than a waste worker. the prominent role of the private company Hysacam However, it was still possible to observe the interac- in the city’s management of household waste tions between the waste collectors and the population. became clear through discussions with neighbour- In general, the use of participant observation with for- hood leaders and households and the observation mal waste workers represents a novelty for research on of the Hysacam-labelled garbage trucks crisscrossing public-private partnerships. the city. The importance of Hysacam was confirmed Furthermore, actual collection points and routes by the municipal staff, who also helped the first were tracked during the tours using a GPS in order to author to get an internship at the company. After map the waste collection frequency of Hysacam in dif- several attempts and the submission of multiple ferent areas of the city. This spatial information was recommendation letters, Hysacam granted the first complemented by quantitative data from author an unpaid 2-month internship in 2015 and a questionnaire survey with 386 households in four a one-week internship in 2016. The research purpose different neighbourhoods (which was mainly used for of the internship was disclosed from the beginning. other parts of the larger study) to appraise spatial During the internships, a total of 10 semi-structured inequalities (research question 3). The questionnaire interviews were carried out with personnel at the included questions about household waste practices Hysacam office in order to get more information on and obstacles encountered with the formal waste collec- the public-private partnership, collection routes, tion service. work terms for the waste collectors, etc. Interviews were conducted with the head officer of human resources, who directed the first author to the head 4. Context officers of the divisions of urban cleanliness, human 4.1 Solid waste management in Bafoussam resources, dumpsite management, and communica- tions. This selection covered all Hysacam officers Bafoussam is the fourth largest city of Cameroon with dealing directly or indirectly with garbage collection. a population of about 400,000 inhabitants on a surface 160 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON of 7,000 ha (Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam In addition, some NGOs and community-based orga- 2013). The city has experienced rapid urban growth nisations organised waste collection in poorer, per- since the 1980s, having doubled its population within ipheral neighbourhoods. However, the capacity of twenty years (BUCREP 2010). Bafoussam is the regional the partly privatised solid waste collection system capital of West Cameroon. Apart from its administrative was still insufficient to meet the needs of the grow- functions, the city is an important centre of regional ing city. Consequently, the urban community and the (agricultural) trade. central government negotiated between 2005 and The Urban Community of Bafoussam is the local 2007 a contract with Hysacam. The new public- government in charge of the city’s economic, social private partnership came into effect in 2008 and and cultural development, including urban planning, was to provide coverage for waste collection in ‘a infrastructure development, transportation, cleanli- large part’ of Bafoussam city (Communauté Urbaine ness and hygiene. The urban community, whose de Bafoussam and Hysacam 2009). The second five- head is nominated by the central government, is year contract expanded the service area to cover the therefore a partner in the public-private partnership ‘entire city’ (Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam and for municipal solid waste management with Hysacam 2014). Hysacam brought in modern equip- Hysacam. It is subdivided in three communes of ment and expertise in waste collection and treatment urban districts with elected mayors and councils. and related logistics, training and human resources However, the role of the communes for urban devel- management. According to a Hysacam official, the opment in general and solid waste management in company employed over 200 people when it started particular is very limited (to some road cleaning and operations in Bafoussam, signifying a tenfold weeding). The 70 administrative neighbourhoods increase in the number of formal waste workers. and the numerous blocs, as well the three main While waste collection has generally improved in traditional chieftaincies, are currently not involved Bafoussam since the arrival of Hysacam, our research in solid waste management either, except for funnel- indicates that a considerable amount of waste ling occasional citizen complaints. remains uncollected, particularly in the unplanned The municipal waste production amounts to areas of the city (see below). This observation echoes about 200 tonnes per day (Communauté Urbaine the assessment of Grelle et al. (2006) before the start de Bafoussam 2013). Data from the urban municipal- of the public-private partnership. A few small com- ity shows that the annual tonnage of waste collected munity-based organisations therefore continue to by Hysacam in Bafoussam is increasing by about operate in some small, peripheral areas. However, 1,000 tons per year. Solid waste is collected from the focus of this paper is not on these forms of households and from collection points and ends up waste collection but on Hysacam’s practices and the in a managed landfill at the periphery of the city. public-private partnership. According to interviewed key informants, munici- pal solid waste collection represented a big chal- 4.2 Equipment, tours and workforce lenge for Bafoussam during the 1990s, as rapid population growth and a steady urban sprawl met A dozen Hysacam garbage trucks crisscross with a financial crisis and limited technical capabil- Bafoussam from Monday to Saturday for seven ities of the municipality for dealing with the increas- hours each in the morning and in the afternoon to ing amounts of garbage. This led to the collect garbage from households. The trucks also accumulation of piles of rubbish in neighbourhoods empty containers of variable sizes from private busi- and streets. In response, the municipality employed nesses located on the important transport axes. The a number of local private entrepreneurs on short- collection takes place in 15 routes defined in the term contracts to keep central parts of the city public-private partnership contract and allocated to clean. As a municipal officer commented: the individual collection teams, usually comprising a driver and two waste collectors. According to the In order to ‘clean the face’ of the city, the urban com- partnership agreement, the drawing of the garbage munity contracted some private service providers for collection routes took into account demographic, street sweeping in the administrative area. . . This did socio-economic and social characteristics, but also not cover the whole city because of the municipality’s limited material and financial resources. urban and natural constraints, particularly the (in-) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 161 accessibility of particular areas (Communauté record when the workers appear at the office and Urbaine de Bafoussam and Hysacam 2014). Waste is who conduct spot-checks in the neighbourhoods to collected daily from residential, administrative and see whether the trucks work properly on their routes. commercial areas: door-to-door along the main Other personnel work at the landfill and a very few at roads in the central parts, and from collection points the administrative offices in the centre of town. in more interior and peripheral parts. All wastes are Waste collectors are given training in Bafoussam; put together and collected at the same time; there is they wear uniforms consisting of protective clothing. no waste segregation at source and no local recy- Drivers, some of whom got promoted from being cling industry (Makamté Kakeu-Tardy 2018). waste collectors, receive training at Hysacam’s head- According to a Hysacam official, the initial 12 collec- quarters in Douala. Information on their monthly tion routes, four per urban district, have recently salary, in part performance-based, was difficult to been extended to 15 routes (of which one was yet obtain. According to some drivers and as stated in to be implemented) in order to keep pace with the the second partnership agreement, the company rapid urban sprawl and intended to cover the entire offers social benefits to its workers, including an urban area on a daily basis. The trucks bring their 80% subsidy on health insurance for them and their load to the landfill, operated by Hysacam, at the family members. They have also access to loans from eastern periphery of the city. a partner bank at advantageous conditions. Hysacam’s fleet in Bafoussam includes 12 garbage trucks of four different types used for different pur- 5. Findings poses (see Table 1). The trucks are imported without major adjustments to local conditions. The compac- 5.1 Rules and incentives of the public-private tor trucks are equipped with a four-tooth and a nine- partnership tooth fork to scrape rubbish from the ground and lift 5.1.1 The institutional arrangement it in the container. The load of a 10-tonne truck is The public-private partnership in solid waste man- emptied twice a day (at the end of each the morning agement in Bafoussam involves Hysacam and two and the afternoon tour); the five-tonne vehicles go to public parties: the central and the local government. the landfill four times a day and the 20-tonne crane- The central Ministry of Housing and Urban truck once a day. This amounts to a total theoretical Development pays the lion share of the city’s waste capacity of 260t/day. collection costs (see below), but delegated the day-to Additional photo 1: -day responsibilities to the Urban Community of Door to door waste collection by Hysacam in Bafoussam. The urban community is designated ‘pro- a residential planned area (Tamdja – Banengo), ject manager’ in the partnership agreement and Bafoussam 2015. mandated to oversee the activities of the private Of the 200 employees, 133 are directly involved in company Hysacam, the ‘service provider’. The con- garbage collection (including 26 drivers and 107 tract covers the collection, transportation and pro- cleaning agents, that is, waste collectors, sweepers cessing of municipal solid waste as well as the and scrapers). There are a few work supervisors, who sweeping and cleaning of Bafoussam’s streets, public squares and markets (Communauté Urbaine de Table 1. Waste collection trucks in Bafoussam. Bafoussam, Hysacam 2014). Model purpose Capacity Quantity As elsewhere in Cameroon, Hysacam has been Compactor truck Door-to-door and 10 tons 6 paid by weight of garbage collected and transported (‘Renault’) collection points ‘Ville de Paris’ Door-to-door and 5 tons 2 to the landfill since the beginning of the public- compactor collection points private partnership in Bafoussam. A monthly weight- truck 3 based garbage collection target is fixed each year by ‘Amplirolls’ hook- 9m containers at fixed 5 tons 3 lift truck collection points the public parties of the partnership based on Crane-truck Collection from wild 20 tons 1 a week-long campaign during which officers of the dumps central ministry and the urban community oversee Total 12 waste collection and the weighing of the garbage Source: field work, contractual document of the public-private part- trucks coming to the landfill. After the week-long nership, 2014 162 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON campaign, the public actors determine the price per Additional photo 2: Weighing the waste truck on unit of collected household waste to be paid to the weighbridge at the municipal waste dump in Hysacam, as well as the fixed amount that the Banefo area. This landfill is run by control agents urban community has to pay to Hysacam on from both Hysacam and the urban community. The a monthly basis. This latter amount is calculated as small car on the picture is that of Hysacam manager. 15% of the costs for collecting the target weight. The Fieldwork, 2015 remaining amount (in theory 85%) is to be paid by the central ministry (Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam, Hysacam 2014). Table 2 shows that in 5.1.2 Incentives for Hysacam’s waste workers reality the urban community’s monthly financial con- Hysacam translates the company’s overall monthly tributions fluctuated between 10% and 12.5% of the weight target to their waste collection teams as the accrued costs in 2014 depending on the total goal of collecting 10 tonnes per seven-hour shift amount of waste collected in a given month. These (locally referred to as ‘tonnage’). As a manager put percentages are comparable to other years for which it: ‘The big mission is to urge on the workers.’ This we have data. led to the ‘hunting for tonnage’ referred to in the As specified in the partnership agreement and title, and what the waste workers called ‘chercher le confirmed by our observations, the garbage trucks tonnage’ or ‘seeking the tonnage’. A Hysacam officer are measured on a weighing bridge at the entrance explained to us that performance-based pay and to the landfill by a municipal employee each time various sanctions, including enquiries, requests for they empty their load. The weight is entered in explanation, warnings, non-paid layoffs or salary a register. When the weighing bridge breaks down, reductions, are applied to those waste workers who the target tonnage is entered in the register. When (regularly) fail to reach this tonnage (as an average at the tonnage target is not reached, the company the end of the week). Waste workers confirmed their incurs financial losses to be covered from its saved fear of being laid off for a few days without pay for funds. If the collected garbage is more than 20% unsatisfactory performance. Consequently, the first below the monthly target or if the trucks are found priority of the waste collection crews was to meet to miss parts of their collection tour, the company the daily 10-tonne target. When the target is not has to pay a penalty. By contrast, if garbage collec- reached, it happens that crews add a tour on Sunday. tion exceeds the tonnage target (which seems to By contrast, good performance is compensated by happen in most months), Hysacam makes a profit. the payment of a premium on the worker’s salary or According to a Hysacam manager, the company ‘also a salary increase. Furthermore, Bafoussam’s three keeps garbage ‘in reserve’ as to balance out monthly best employees of the year are invited to an annual fluctuations’ (and thus avoid paying penalties). ‘celebration of excellence’ organised in Yaoundé and Table 2. Waste tonnage collected by Hysacam and related service payments in Bafoussam during the year 2014. Waste collected Payment of HYSACAM services (in tonnes) (in CFA) Unit price of the tonnage Central State Bafoussam municipality Month Daily Monthly (in CAF) (≈85%) (≈15%) January 222 6 005.40 16 230 86 985 392 10 482 250 February 192 5 173.40 16 230 73 482 032 10 482 250 March 218 5 889.00 16 230 85 096 220 10 482 250 April 225 5 847.50 16 230 84 422 675 10 482 250 May 205 5 321.00 16 230 75 877 580 10 482 250 June 221 5 748.20 16 230 82 811 036 10 482 250 July 228 5 922.60 16 230 85 641 548 10 482 250 August 224 5 828.50 16 230 84 114 305 10 482 250 September 216 5 625.50 16 230 80 819 615 10 482 250 October 240 6 244.80 16 230 90 870 854 10 482 250 November 222 5 774.00 16 230 83 229 770 10 482 250 December 16 230 10 482 250 Source: Archival report from the urban community, 2014 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 163 Douala and put up free of cost in a hotel. Waste Table 3. Waste tonnages during the morning and the evening services. workers also told us that well-performing drivers Waste collection A.m. service P.m. service and collectors tend to be allotted to the central, Main Planned x x more prestigious part of the city, where tonnage is Itinerary Unplanned x x more easily reached (see below). According to Central x x Hysacam officers, the company tries to foster good Periphery x x x Residential x x x relations to and among its employees, not only Commercial x x through the provision of good working conditions, Observed 11.220 12 7 9.801 but also the organisation of leisure events for the tonnages 11.800 12, 640 9.208 10.520 11.960 13.780 10.103 10.740 workers and their families. As a company manager Source: Fieldwork, 2015 remarked: ‘The CEO is very attentive to the social.’ 5.2 Waste collection practices on the ground Furthermore, the pressure to achieve the required tonnage pushes crews to collect materials that are 5.2.1 The hunt for tonnage not supposed to go with the household or commer- The fear of not reaching the 10-tonne daily average cial wastes. A common practice is to take stones and target within the period of a week or a month led the scrape earth when garbage has to be shovelled from crews to maximize collection. As a Hysacam truck the ground. Sometimes the crews deliberately collect driver told us at the beginning of an afternoon tour heavy soil, construction waste (which should be that led the crew from relatively peripheral to central picked up by municipal services), car tyres, banana parts later on: trunks, etc. to reach the 10-tonne target (figure1). These dubious practices were hidden from If we collect at least 10.5 tonnes this evening, it would help to guarantee at least the 10-tonne average for tomorrow. Hysacam’s management, as some of them can also damage the trucks. A truck driver said to us: Exceeding the 10 tonnes was quite common. In fact, I also told [the waste workers] to stop picking up car the crews tried to maximize daily collection weights, tires. They thought that it would help to reach the sometimes reaching as much as 13–15 tonnes. tonnage. On the contrary that’s what blocks the com- However, the Hysacam management advised the paction of garbage in the truck. Actually, when the crews to stay within the 11–12-tonne limit, the actual garbage compaction system gets blocked, we have to leave the routes and go to the landfill just to be weight capacity of the trucks, in order to avoid fre- informed that we have only 8 tons or 9.8 tons of quent and costly repairs. waste collected.’ Hysacam allocates the crews, whose composition is relatively stable, to the particular routes. Waste workers preferred the morning shift, when the lar- 5.2.2 The workers’ bias toward central and gely organic (kitchen) waste is fresh, still contains planned settlements much water and is relatively heavy. Garbage col- As indicated, waste workers also preferred the routes lected in the afternoon is generally lighter, as it lies leading through the city centre and planned settle- around under the sunshine and dries up. Therefore, it ments, because overall consumption and thus waste is easier to meet and exceed the weight target on the production are higher in these relatively prosperous morning shift. The disparity between the morning neighbourhoods. At the urban periphery, by contrast, and afternoon shift is further pronounced through we observed that garbage is often composed of a lot the fact that the morning routes cover disproportion- light rubbish, such as corn leaves, which does not allow ally the central parts and the main roads of the city, the crews to reach the tonnage quickly (figure 2). where more garbage accrues that can be collected However, the preference for central and planned fast (see below). By contrast, the afternoon collection neighbourhoods was also due to the prevalent door- service is performed mostly in less accessible neigh- to-door collection in these areas that allows the bourhoods and in suburbs. As an illustration, Table 3 waste crews to work and achieve the required ton- shows the achieved tonnage from the 12 different nage faster and more easily. A waste truck driver tours that we accompanied. explained to us that in the city centre ‘. . . there are 164 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON Figure 1. Piles of banana trunks and soil collected from the urban periphery. Source: Fieldwork, Bafoussam 2015 much more bins distributed along the street to col- In unplanned settlements, by contrast, waste is lect waste and . . . it’s easier to empty and go ahead collected from collection points along the main on these routes.’ In these areas, the drivers alert the roads as the trucks are unable to reach the interior households by horn, inviting them to bring out their of these mostly peripheral neighbourhoods with nar- garbage in big bags and to give them directly to the row streets. Here, mostly women and children bring waste workers who throw them in the compactor their household rubbish to large bins and containers truck. Waste workers confirmed to us that garbage put up at strategic points (figure 4). collected in this way facilitates the loading of waste A garbage truck driver remarked: and speeds up the operation so that they can keep The general problem in this sector is that people do not their tight time schedule. We observed the teams know the Hysacam transit schedule, so they do not go rushing from corner to corner in these parts in out with the trash on time. They wait for the truck’s horn before bringing their bins to us. order to collect the trash quickly (figure 3). Figure 2. Collecting lightweight waste from the street in a peripheral Figure 3. A waste collector running to collect waste on a main road of neighbourhood. the city. Source: Fieldwork, Bafoussam 2015 Source: Fieldwork, Bafoussam 2015 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 165 [People] seem not to perceive their part of the respon- sibility to make it easier for urban cleaners and to help ensure a clean environment that benefits everyone. In a similar vein, another waste worker commented: The students’ behaviour from the bilingual high school in this neighbourhood is death. Despite our repeated warnings to fill the bins, they always drop almost every- thing on the ground while the bin is empty.. When we question some of them, they tell us that we are paid to do it. But in an area, where you have to serve at least 1,000 customers, you have to lose up to 15 minutes for a single customer, you cannot cover the area. Another waste truck driver confirmed the difficulty of covering unplanned neighbourhoods: Figure 4. Garbage collection from a collection point on the main street of a peripheral neighbourhood. When you spend time picking up waste from the ground, Source: Fieldwork, Bafoussam 2015 it takes longer and you can’t cover the area. . .. In this neighbourhood block, you’ll see how it’s going to be slower. That’s why we do not cover the area. We could Some people in unplanned areas can neither afford make it if we could just carry the bins, empty them and to wait for the Hysacam truck to pass at a specific drop them; empty and drop. If we were not wasting our time during the day, as all household members have time at a place like this, we would have progressed as we to pursue livelihood activities. Therefore, garbage is go: gently, gently and speed up in places that have less garbage to save time. We spend almost all the time pitch- often poured on the street at the collection points. forking garbage from the ground. For example, we started Driving through a south-western unplanned suburb, at 2:55 pm, it is already 3:30 pm and we are still at the a waste truck driver lamented: beginning of the route . . .. [Laughs] The time to fork, that’s what wastes all the time. In this area, many people pour garbage on the ground.. . . Collection from the ground can last easily up to 10 min- As the quotes above indicate, waste crews often do utes of pitchforking.. not serve the more problematic parts of their route (unplanned, poor and peripheral areas) as regularly This practice occurred even where containers were as they are supposed to according to the instructions provided, as another waste worker commented: from the Hysacam management and the urban com- People pour garbage on the floor when they can’t see munity. Instead, it happens, particularly when they a container around. However, even when a bin is avail- wasted time collecting garbage from the ground and able, people’s behaviour remains almost the same. It are under time pressure to reach the tonnage, that seems like they do not realize how difficult it is for Hysacam agents to pick up on the floor instead of waste teams change the prescribed route to make directly emptying the trash into the truck. . .. a detour through the rubbish-rich city centre before driving to the landfill at the end of their shift. It Many people whose house is relatively far from the seems that the crews do not always agree on which collection bring their rubbish by wheelbarrow. As route or deviation to take, as a truck driver indicated: they are unable to lift the wheelbarrow to the con- tainer opening, they dump the garbage on the Even when I was newly introduced in this 3.1C route, ground. Children also fail to reach the height of the I had (already) 9 years of professional experience in waste collection. I am one of the oldest employees of container and are thus forced to leave the refuse on Hysacam in Bafoussam. I master the field and I do not the ground. In order to pick up garbage from the appreciate the garbage collectors of this route some- ground more quickly, the drivers get down from the times tell me the way to follow. truck to lend a hand to the collectors. Apart from the above-mentioned practical reasons Our observations confirm the assertion in the above for littering, some people do not feel any responsibility quote: It is usually the drivers, who are senior to the to keep the city clean and facilitate the work of the collectors, who take the decisions whether to follow waste crews. The above-cited truck driver complained: or deviate from the prescribed route. Our 166 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON observations also indicate that work supervisors from informal collection practices described above. Given Hysacam and controllers from the urban community the incentive system in place, Hysacam and the conducted hardly any spot-checks in peripheral, waste workers are primarily interested in achieving unplanned areas so that the crews had little to fear the tonnage. Peripheral and unplanned neighbour- if they short-circuited these. hoods are therefore neglected, while the city centre and the main roads are kept very clean. The map in Figure 5, based on the GPS tracking of every collec- 5.2.3 Hysacam management’s bias toward tion point of each of the 15 routes, shows the high central administrative parts density of service delivery in the city centre, in The waste workers’ informal practices favouring planned areas and along main roads while garbage Bafoussam’s central areas pronounce an in-built offi- pickup points are sparse or absent in the urban cial bias toward the city centre, administrative dis- periphery and in unplanned settlements. trict, high streets, main arteries and the The inequality of waste services is further confirmed neighbourhoods where the majority of senior by data from our household survey in four selected bureaucrats, politicians and rich people live. The neighbourhoods (see Figure 6). Waste collection is bet- urban community and Hysacam set the routes in ter in planned and more central areas than in such a way that many morning crews start their unplanned settlements. But even in the centrally tour along the main roads of the administrative dis- located rich neighbourhood of Banengo, a relatively trict and the high streets. These parts of the city are high percentage of garbage is dumped in an uncon- officially included again on afternoon routes so that trolled way. In the peripheral area of Banefo, only one in they are served at least twice a day. Furthermore, four households accesses the formal waste collection Hysacam spontaneously deployed special teams to services, although Hysacam’s truck pass there regularly keep these politically strategic places clean. Very because of the nearby landfill. often the most dynamic crews were attributed to these zones. A waste truck driver explained to us: There are also so-called catch-up teams who collect 5. Discussion waste in the zones that we could not reach during the The observed uneven waste collection between planned service. . . They work especially on the main axes of the city to clean the face of the city. The city centre should and unplanned settlements and the resulting disparities be cleaned all the time so that the mayor or the dele- in cleanliness and in the quality of life seem to be the gate of the government believe that the whole city norm rather than the exception in privatised solid waste would be that clean. management systems in sub-Saharan African cities. In It appears that the city centre and the main arteries contrast to Dar es Salam, however, the spatial inequal- are kept clean in order to present a good image of ities and environmental injustices in Bafoussam were not the city, as well as of Hysacam’s services. As influenced by differences in purchasing power and the Hysacam’s engagement in Bafoussam’s waste sector willingness to pay for waste removal that lead private is dependent on political decisions, they have an companies to neglect poorer neighbourhoods (Kassim interest in providing good services in areas that are and Ali 2006). Neither was there a deliberate total exclu- well visible to the political decision makers. sion of unplanned neighbourhoods from waste services as reported from Accra (Baabereyir et al. 2012). Rather, the unplanned areas in Bafoussam were neglected 4.5 Socio-spatial outcomes because of a complex incentive system working at dif- Morphological features, such as the uneven (quality ferent levels that is largely based on payments and of the) urban road network or the density of settle- penalties depending on the weight of garbage col- ments, influences undoubtedly the waste collection lected. Hysacam, in their search for profits (‘This is busi- (by garbage trucks) in different parts of Bafoussam. ness after all,’ as a company officer admitted to us), However, the spatial inequality of waste collection in effectively passed the weight incentive down to its this city is not just ‘natural’ but also influenced by workers. This led to a situation where the individual political decisions determining the routes and by the waste worker teams ‘hunt for tonnage’ in areas where INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 167 Figure 5. Actual itineraries of Hysacam trucks in Bafoussam. Source: Fieldwork (GPS tracking), 2015 Figure 6. Types of household waste removal in four neighbourhoods of Bafoussam. Source: Fieldwork (household survey), 2015 168 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON garbageismoreabundantand easier to collect, that is, underestimated garbage collection target fixed dur- in planned, well-off neighbourhoods. This hunt for ton- ing the week-long weighing campaign each year. nage reinforced an existing bias stemming from political The relatively low targets also allow Hysacam to decisions to allocate more teams and routes in these increase their profits. It is less clear why the central areas in order to keep the city centre clean and beautiful ministry, which is represented during annual week- and to preserve the image of the city. As waste collection long weighing campaigns and which pays extra for in Bafoussam is financed entirely through public funds each unit of garbage collected above the fixed tar- and not through user fees, the public-private partner- gets, allows these malpractices to happen and ship implicitly and disproportionately subsidises richer a monopolistic situation to exist. It appears that households in planned areas, similarly to what has been there were close relations in the past between observed by Baabereyir et al. (2012)inAccra. Hysacam’s executives and the central government. The observed incentive system has other perverse In any case, the principal-agent problem that effects: it discourages recycling and composting – parti- Awortwi (2004) describes in the case of public- cularly the latter would lower the weight of collected private partnerships in Ghana’s waste sector is garbage as heavy organic wastes would enter a different further complicated in Cameroon through the exis- stream. The pay-per-tonnage system also encourages tence of two public partners. In Bafoussam, the pub- waste workers to engage in dubious practices, such as lic partner that should theoretically be interested in collecting soil or construction debris. However, alter- keeping the cost of garbage collection low (i.e. the native, non-weight-incentivised solid waste collection central ministry) does not directly monitor and super- systems whereby different private contractors are vise the private party. responsible for their respective zones seem not to fare better, particularly when monitoring is weak. In 6. Conclusions Trivandrum, India, for example, collected waste is often simply dumped in poorer neighbourhoods by private This paper has described and analysed waste collection contractors (Joly 2018; see also Sory and Tallet (2015)for in Bafoussam, Cameroon, with the aim to better under- a similar situation in Ouagadougou). Indeed, weight- stand (and thus avoid) the production of spatial based monitoring at a centralized landfill site, especially inequalities and injustices under public-private partner- if it were combined with regular inspections of the ships. The partnership between the urban ministry collected garbage, appear to be relatively uncostly and (central government), the urban community (local gov- potentially effective. ernment) and Hysacam (private company) is based on The urban community and Hysacam concentrated a minimum monthly weight target and the remunera- their monitoring efforts in the city centre, the latter tion of the private partner by weight of collected gar- to please the politicians and bureaucrats from whose bage. Our participant observation has revealed that decisions the continuation of its monopolistic con- Hysacam’s waste workers feared sanctions if they failed tract is dependent. Neither Hysacam nor the urban to collect the daily target of 10 tonnes and that they community have an obvious incentive to bring better were encouraged to engage in a ‘hunt for tonnage’.In waste collection to the populous unplanned settle- this endeavour, they sometimes also collected (heavy) ments; Hysacam is led by a profit motive, and the non-household wastes. Further, they deviated from urban community is appointed by the central gov- their official routes to collect waste in planned, central ernment and therefore has no votes to gain through parts of the city where the tonnage can be more easily good service delivery in the periphery. At the same attained than in unplanned settlements. This practice time, there were hardly any complaints from the contributes to uneven service delivery (confirmed by underserved neighbourhoods; the current collection our household surveys and GPS tracking), socio-spatial system is probably better than the former municipal inequality and environmental injustice borne in periph- one, and certainly not worse. The urban community eral unplanned settlements. has no direct interest in checking on dubious waste Our study suggests that, apart from better mon- hunting practices either, as their monthly financial itoring by the urban community, the incentive sys- contribution is fixed. But they benefit from the tem leading to the hunt for garbage and the role of INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 169 the urban ministry as a remote public partner would More generally, our research points to the impor- need to be rethought to reduce the disparities in tance of considering the practices and motivations of Bafoussam’s waste removal. Effective decentraliza- all stakeholders, including the waste workers, for the tion of solid waste management (beyond the current design of public-private partnerships in solid waste man- deconcentration to the urban community, which is agement. It further indicates the need to involve institu- nominated by the central government) and the inclu- tions that are accountable to residents, particularly those sion of an elected body in the public-private partner- of peripheral and unplanned settlements, so that ship would strengthen downward accountability, inequalities in service provision and environmental injus- including to people living in peripheral and tices can be reduced. unplanned settlements, which is necessary to change the incentive structures currently favouring the hunt Notes for tonnage in central parts of the city. An elected and decentralized body is more likely to have an 1. A waste management system in which there is little or interest to monitor waste collection in peripheral no relationship between public agencies and private parts of the city and to foster good relations between companies, the latter of which have full responsibility for a city’s or a neighbourhood’s services, or at least of residents and waste workers with a potential to some of its components, such as collection, transport or move the workers’ incentives structure away from treatment (Awortwi 2004). company-instilled fear to reach a fixed tonnage 2. http://blog.secteur-prive-developpement.fr/2012/10/29/ towards providing an adequate service adjusted to la-voie-camerounaise-vers-une-meilleure-gestion-des- the needs of local residents. dechets/. 3. A formal affiliation, such as an internship, is often neces- However, the socio-spatial inequalities in sary in the Cameroonian context to access and inter- Bafoussam’s waste collection are not the consequence view officials. of an increased neglect of unplanned settlements com- 4. Interview, 09.02.2015 at 10.00 am. pared to the municipal household waste collection sys- 5. Interview, 03.08.2016 at 10.00 am. tem prior to 2008. Comparing the city’s situation today 6. Interview, 03.08.2016 at 10.00am. 7. Interview, 03.08.2016 at 10.00am. to the description by Grelle et al. (2006), one can state 8. Interview, 03.08.2016, 11.30 am. that the city has made significant improvements in the 9. Conversation, 07.04.2015 at 3:04 pm. urban cleanliness since Hysacam’s arrival. The public- 10. Conversation, 20.03.2015 at 10am. private partnership has brought daily waste collection. 11. Conversation, 16.03.2015 at 3.30pm. At least the city centre and the main roads are cleaned 12. Conversation, 23.03.2015, 6:30am. 13. Conversation, 6.04.2015 at 3.00pm. regularly today while even these areas were filled with 14. Conversation, 10.03.2015, 9.00am. heaps of rubbish in the mid-2000s (Grelle et al. 2006). 15. Conversation, 10.03.2015, 9.00am. The challenge now is to extend these improvements 16. Conversation, 6.04.2015 at 3.00 pm. to more peripheral and unplanned parts of the city. For 17. Conversation, 16.03.2015 at 3.30 pm. this, Hysacam’s imported equipment and approach are 18. Conversation, 20.03.2015 at 10.00 am. 19. Conversation, 6.04.2015 at 3.00pm. inappropriate. As recommended for Cameroon’s capi- 20. Personal communication, 10.03.2018. tal cities of Yaoundé and Douala (Parrot et al. 2009; 21. It has been observed that in similar systems based on pay McKay et al. 2015; Ngambi 2016), we suggest potential per tonnage, collected household waste was sprayed with solutions for Bafoussam to be based on the inclusion of water just before entering the weight bridge to the landfill additional stakeholders, such as CBOs, NGOs and small (personal communication C. Zurbrügg). 22. However, tensions between the central government businesses, and on the development of pre-collection and Hysacam have come to the fore since early 2018, systems in interior, less accessible areas and transfer when the former failed to pay the arrears for delivered stations. Such pre-collection systems would need to be waste services in Doula and introduced competitive planned and accompanied by participatory processes bidding for waste collection in peripheral parts of that as to reduce current household malpractices caused by city. In September 2018, the contracts went to three small and medium enterprises (Agence Ecofin, 2018). unsuitable equipment, inappropriate timing of collec- tion and lack of awareness. This would break Hysacam’s monopoly but the company might have an opportu- Disclosure statement nity to expand its operations due to the availability of increased amount of garbage to be collected. No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. 170 R. C. MAKAMTÉ KAKEU–TARDY AND R. VÉRON Funding results report]. http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/down loads/Rapport_de_presentation_3_RGPH.pdf. French. This work was supported by the Swiss Government Excellence Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam. 2013.Plan d‘urbanisme direc- Scholarship Programme; and by the University of Lausanne. teur de la ville de Bafoussam, horizon 2026. [Master plan of Bafoussam city. Horizon 2026]. Yaoundé: Breit Consulting Sarl. French. Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam, Hysacam. 2009. Contrat Notes on contributors de partenariat public-privé. Cinq (05) ans - 2009 à 2014. [Public-private partnership contract. Five (05) years - 2009 Rolande Christelle Makamté Kakeu - Tardy completed her PhD to 2014]. BREIT Consulting Sarl, Yaoundé: French. at the Institute of Geography and Sustainability, University of Communauté Urbaine de Bafoussam, Hysacam. 2014. Contrat Lausanne. She is interested in urban environment and govern- de partenariat public-privé. Cinq (05) ans - 2014 à 2019. ance, environmental justice and municipal solid waste manage- [Public-private partnership contract. Five (05) years - 2014 ment with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and applying the to 2019]. BREIT Consulting Sarl, Yaoundé: French. theoretical approach of urban political ecology. Ezebilo EE, Animasaun ED. 2011. 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Environ Urban. 05-2015-0098 12:103–117. doi:10.1177/095624780001200209
Journal
International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development
– Taylor & Francis
Published: May 4, 2019
Keywords: Public-private partnerships; solid waste management; environmental justice; incentives; sub-Saharan Africa
