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Explaining seeing? Disentangling qualia from perceptual organization

Explaining seeing? Disentangling qualia from perceptual organization Abstract Visual perception and integration seem to play an essential role in our conscious phenomenology. Relatively local neural processing of reentrant nature may explain several visual integration processes (feature binding or figure–ground segregation, object recognition, inference, competition), even without attention or cognitive control. Based on the above statements, should the neural signatures of visual integration (via reentrant process) be non‐reportable phenomenological qualia? We argue that qualia are not required to understand this perceptual organization. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Cognitive Neuroscience Taylor & Francis

Explaining seeing? Disentangling qualia from perceptual organization

Cognitive Neuroscience , Volume 1 (3): 2 – Aug 18, 2010
37 pages

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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright 2010 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
ISSN
1758-8936
eISSN
1758-8928
DOI
10.1080/17588928.2010.497581
pmid
24168339
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Visual perception and integration seem to play an essential role in our conscious phenomenology. Relatively local neural processing of reentrant nature may explain several visual integration processes (feature binding or figure–ground segregation, object recognition, inference, competition), even without attention or cognitive control. Based on the above statements, should the neural signatures of visual integration (via reentrant process) be non‐reportable phenomenological qualia? We argue that qualia are not required to understand this perceptual organization.

Journal

Cognitive NeuroscienceTaylor & Francis

Published: Aug 18, 2010

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