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Zenon Bankowski, Ian White, and Ulrike Hahn, Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning

Zenon Bankowski, Ian White, and Ulrike Hahn, Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning 364 BOOK REVIEW the necessity for a decision to be made, even if information is incomplete: withholding judgement is not an option; that a conclusion, even if defeasible, is not uncertain: it is true until defeated; that some conditions need to be established whereas others can be assumed unless the contrary is shown; that legal conclusions must be justified, typically by an argument; that legal reasoning takes place in a dialogical context; that in addition to rules there are policies or principles; that some arguments turn on weighing competing considerations, rather than deduction. Since the papers were written these ideas have moved into the mainstream of AI and Law research. A considerable body of work (e.g. [1], [2]) by a variety of people, not least Giovanni Sartor, has established the study of argument as a central concern when modelling legal reasoning, so as to accommodate and account for such phenomena as those listed above. Thus someone who has followed develop- ments in AI and Law will find little new here, although it is useful to be reminded of the legal theory underlying this work. In contrast the papers dealing with cases, analogy and open texture, are difficult to relate http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Zenon Bankowski, Ian White, and Ulrike Hahn, Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 7 (4) – Sep 30, 2004
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References (5)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1023/A:1008377830602
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

364 BOOK REVIEW the necessity for a decision to be made, even if information is incomplete: withholding judgement is not an option; that a conclusion, even if defeasible, is not uncertain: it is true until defeated; that some conditions need to be established whereas others can be assumed unless the contrary is shown; that legal conclusions must be justified, typically by an argument; that legal reasoning takes place in a dialogical context; that in addition to rules there are policies or principles; that some arguments turn on weighing competing considerations, rather than deduction. Since the papers were written these ideas have moved into the mainstream of AI and Law research. A considerable body of work (e.g. [1], [2]) by a variety of people, not least Giovanni Sartor, has established the study of argument as a central concern when modelling legal reasoning, so as to accommodate and account for such phenomena as those listed above. Thus someone who has followed develop- ments in AI and Law will find little new here, although it is useful to be reminded of the legal theory underlying this work. In contrast the papers dealing with cases, analogy and open texture, are difficult to relate

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 30, 2004

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