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Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations
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Introduction to the Two Volumes
In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers.
Axiomathes – Springer Journals
Published: Dec 1, 2022
Keywords: Analytic Philosophy; Appeal to intuition; Argument; Metaphilosophy; Philosophical methodology
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