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Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here! In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Axiomathes Springer Journals

Your Appeals to Intuition Have No Power Here!

Axiomathes , Volume 32 (6) – Dec 1, 2022

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References (88)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021
ISSN
1122-1151
eISSN
1572-8390
DOI
10.1007/s10516-021-09560-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers.

Journal

AxiomathesSpringer Journals

Published: Dec 1, 2022

Keywords: Analytic Philosophy; Appeal to intuition; Argument; Metaphilosophy; Philosophical methodology

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