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Tennis manipulation: can we help serena williams win another tournament?

Tennis manipulation: can we help serena williams win another tournament? This article focuses on the question of whether a certain candidate’s (player’s) chance to advance further in a tennis tournament can be increased when the ordering of the tournament can be controlled (manipulated by the organizers) according to his own preferences. Is it possible to increase the number of ranking points a player will receive? And most importantly, can it be done in reasonable computational time? The answers to these questions differ for different settings. e.g., the information available on the outcome of each game, the significance of the number of points gained or of the number of games won. We analyzed five different variations of these tournament questions. First the complexity hardness of trying to control the tournaments is shown. Then, the tools of parametrized complexity are used to investigate the source of the problems’ hardness. Specifically, we check whether this hardness holds when the size of the problem is bounded. The findings of this analysis show that it is possible under certain circumstances to control the tournament in favor of a specific candidate in order to help him advance further in the tournament. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence Springer Journals

Tennis manipulation: can we help serena williams win another tournament?

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer International Publishing Switzerland
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); Mathematics, general; Computer Science, general; Complex Systems
ISSN
1012-2443
eISSN
1573-7470
DOI
10.1007/s10472-017-9549-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article focuses on the question of whether a certain candidate’s (player’s) chance to advance further in a tennis tournament can be increased when the ordering of the tournament can be controlled (manipulated by the organizers) according to his own preferences. Is it possible to increase the number of ranking points a player will receive? And most importantly, can it be done in reasonable computational time? The answers to these questions differ for different settings. e.g., the information available on the outcome of each game, the significance of the number of points gained or of the number of games won. We analyzed five different variations of these tournament questions. First the complexity hardness of trying to control the tournaments is shown. Then, the tools of parametrized complexity are used to investigate the source of the problems’ hardness. Specifically, we check whether this hardness holds when the size of the problem is bounded. The findings of this analysis show that it is possible under certain circumstances to control the tournament in favor of a specific candidate in order to help him advance further in the tournament.

Journal

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence – Springer Journals

Published: Apr 24, 2017

References

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    Aziz, H; Brill, M; Fischer, F; Harrenstein, P; Lang, J; Seedig, HG
  • The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
    Bartholdi, JJ; Tovey, CA; Trick, MA
  • How hard is it to control an election?
    Bartholdi, JJ; Tovey, CA; Trick, MA
  • Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
    Betzler, N; Uhlmann, J
  • Fixed-parameter tractability and completeness II: On completeness for w [1]
    Downey, RG; Fellows, MR
  • Control complexity in bucklin and fallback voting: An experimental analysis
    Erdélyi, G; Fellows, MR; Rothe, J; Schend, L
  • Comparing draws for single elimination tournaments
    Horen, J; Riezman, R
  • Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
    Lang, J; Pini, MS; Rossi, F; Salvagnin, D; Venable, KB; Walsh, T
  • On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
    Mattei, N; Goldsmith, J; Klapper, A; Mundhenk, M
  • Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
    Walsh, T