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Artificial Intelligence and Law 11: 245–250, 2003. 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. EUGENIO BULYGIN Arroyo 963, 1007 Buenos Aires, Argentina E-mail: ebulygin@xlnet.com.ar The paper by the well-known logician Jaap Hage is concerned with the problem of defeasible reasoning in the domain of law. As the author rightly observes at the very beginning of his paper, though a considerable amount of literature has been written about the defeasible reasoning in the law, the question what this defeasibility exactly amounts to has received scarce attention. In this sense, his paper contributes to fill a sensible gap, at least in the English literature. The paper deals with three questions: (1) The notion of defeasibility, (2) the role of defeasibility in the law and (3) the need of non-monotonic logic for the analysis of defeasible legal reasoning. Hage begins by distinguishing between defeasibility and non-monotonic- ity; the first being a characteristic of certain arguments, whereas the latter is a property of certain logical systems. Even if a non-monotonic logic might be useful for representing defeasible arguments, the two notions should not be conflated. In order to clarify the nature of defeasibility, Hage distinguishes five kinds of defeasibility: ontological, conceptual, epistemic,
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: Nov 7, 2004
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