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Review of Jaap Hage's Law and Defeasibility

Review of Jaap Hage's Law and Defeasibility Artificial Intelligence and Law 11: 245–250, 2003. 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. EUGENIO BULYGIN Arroyo 963, 1007 Buenos Aires, Argentina E-mail: ebulygin@xlnet.com.ar The paper by the well-known logician Jaap Hage is concerned with the problem of defeasible reasoning in the domain of law. As the author rightly observes at the very beginning of his paper, though a considerable amount of literature has been written about the defeasible reasoning in the law, the question what this defeasibility exactly amounts to has received scarce attention. In this sense, his paper contributes to fill a sensible gap, at least in the English literature. The paper deals with three questions: (1) The notion of defeasibility, (2) the role of defeasibility in the law and (3) the need of non-monotonic logic for the analysis of defeasible legal reasoning. Hage begins by distinguishing between defeasibility and non-monotonic- ity; the first being a characteristic of certain arguments, whereas the latter is a property of certain logical systems. Even if a non-monotonic logic might be useful for representing defeasible arguments, the two notions should not be conflated. In order to clarify the nature of defeasibility, Hage distinguishes five kinds of defeasibility: ontological, conceptual, epistemic, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Review of Jaap Hage's Law and Defeasibility

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 11 (3) – Nov 7, 2004

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046012.44321.27
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Artificial Intelligence and Law 11: 245–250, 2003. 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. EUGENIO BULYGIN Arroyo 963, 1007 Buenos Aires, Argentina E-mail: ebulygin@xlnet.com.ar The paper by the well-known logician Jaap Hage is concerned with the problem of defeasible reasoning in the domain of law. As the author rightly observes at the very beginning of his paper, though a considerable amount of literature has been written about the defeasible reasoning in the law, the question what this defeasibility exactly amounts to has received scarce attention. In this sense, his paper contributes to fill a sensible gap, at least in the English literature. The paper deals with three questions: (1) The notion of defeasibility, (2) the role of defeasibility in the law and (3) the need of non-monotonic logic for the analysis of defeasible legal reasoning. Hage begins by distinguishing between defeasibility and non-monotonic- ity; the first being a characteristic of certain arguments, whereas the latter is a property of certain logical systems. Even if a non-monotonic logic might be useful for representing defeasible arguments, the two notions should not be conflated. In order to clarify the nature of defeasibility, Hage distinguishes five kinds of defeasibility: ontological, conceptual, epistemic,

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 7, 2004

References