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Relationships between obligations and actions in the context of institutional agents, human agents or software agents

Relationships between obligations and actions in the context of institutional agents, human... The paper presents a logical framework for the representation of interactions between institutional agents, human agents and software agents. A case study is used to analyze how obligations on institutional agents are “propagated” to human and software agents, and how actions performed by these agents count as actions that satisfy the obligations imposed to institutional agents. It is shown that the relationship between the different kinds of obligations and actions can be represented in terms of the concept of “count as” proposed by Searle, of role and of causality. The logical framework focus on those three concepts. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Relationships between obligations and actions in the context of institutional agents, human agents or software agents

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 19 (3) – Jul 14, 2011

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); Philosophy of Law; Law of the Sea, Air and Outer Space; Legal Aspects of Computing; Computational Linguistics
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1007/s10506-011-9110-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper presents a logical framework for the representation of interactions between institutional agents, human agents and software agents. A case study is used to analyze how obligations on institutional agents are “propagated” to human and software agents, and how actions performed by these agents count as actions that satisfy the obligations imposed to institutional agents. It is shown that the relationship between the different kinds of obligations and actions can be represented in terms of the concept of “count as” proposed by Searle, of role and of causality. The logical framework focus on those three concepts.

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Jul 14, 2011

References