Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
P. Smets, R. Kennes (1991)
The Transferable Belief Model
A. Jøsang (2001)
A Logic for Uncertain ProbabilitiesInt. J. Uncertain. Fuzziness Knowl. Based Syst., 9
W. Thompson, Edward Schumann (1987)
Interpretation of statistical evidence in criminal trialsLaw and Human Behavior, 11
Martin Edman (1980)
The Probable and the ProvablePhilosophical Books, 21
D. Ellsberg (1961)
Decision, probability, and utility: Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms
D. Ellsberg (1961)
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage AxiomsQuarterly Journal of Ecomonics, 75
A. Hunter (1997)
Uncertainty in Information Systems
M. Cohen (1985)
An Expert System Framework for Non-monotonic Reasoning About Probabilistic Assumptions
(1984)
Review of Shafer's a mathematical theory of evidence
M. Smithson (1989)
Ignorance and Uncertainty
R. Tarling, Richard Eggleston (1979)
Evidence, Proof and Probability.The Statistician, 28
G. James (1941)
Relevancy, Probability and the LawCalifornia Law Review, 29
Amihai Motro (1997)
Uncertainty Management in Information Systems: From Needs to SolutionsJournal of Risk and Insurance, 65
J. Baldwin (1986)
Support logic programmingInternational Journal of Intelligent Systems, 1
R. Simon, L. Mahan (1971)
Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the ClassroomLaw & Society Review, 5
W. Thompson, E. Schumann (1987)
Interpretation of statistical evidence in criminal trials: The prosecutor's fallacy and the defense attorney's fallacyLaw and Human Behavior, 11
A. Jøsang, S. Knapskog (1998)
A metric for trusted systems
A. Hunter (1996)
Uncertainty in Information Systems: An Introduction to Techniques and Applications
A. Jones, A. Kaufmann, H. Zimmermann (1986)
Fuzzy sets theory and applications
R. Simon, L. Mahan (1971)
Quantifying burdens of proofLaw and Society Review, 5
Richard Eggleston (1983)
Evidence, Proof and Probability
(1968)
People vs. Collins. 68 Cal 2d 319
(1996)
R vs. Adams. 2 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), R
William Thompsont, Edward Schumannt (1987)
The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy*
Judges and jurors must make decisions in an environment of ignoranceand uncertainty for example by hearing statements of possibly unreliable ordishonest witnesses, assessing possibly doubtful or irrelevantevidence, and enduring attempts by the opponents to manipulate thejudge's and the jurors' perceptions and feelings. Three importantaspects of decision making in this environment are the quantificationof sufficient proof, the weighing of pieces of evidence, and therelevancy of evidence. This paper proposes a mathematical frameworkfor dealing with the two first aspects, namely the quantification ofproof and weighing of evidence. Our approach is based on subjectivelogic, which is an extension of standard logic and probability theory,in which the notion of probability is extended by including degrees ofuncertainty. Subjective Logic is a framework for modelling humanreasoning and we show how it can be applied to legalreasoning.
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 3, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.