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31 I argued for this Quinean perspective on (legal) logic in Hage
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gives a number of references in footnote 21 These include Alexy He might also have included Hage
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21 Alexy
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part five kinds of defeasibility are distinguished that is ontological, conceptual, epistemic, justification and logical defeasibility. In the second part it is argued that from these, justification defeat is the phenomenon that plays a role in legal reasoning. In the third part, the view is defended that non-monotonic logics are not necessary to model justification defeat, but that they are so to speak the natural way to model this phenomenon.
Artificial Intelligence and Law – Springer Journals
Published: Nov 7, 2004
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