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Judicial Decisions and Artificial Intelligence

Judicial Decisions and Artificial Intelligence 312 MICHELE TARUFFO be considered as the relatively best approximation to the reality of decision-making in modern legal systems. (a) There is no need, however, to choose a whole theory of judicial decision among the pre-existing and “ready made” theories and to assume it once forever as valid in all its details. Rather, it may be useful just to stress some basic points drawing them from the best theories available. One of these points is that the judicial decision can and should be considered as a set of choices among alter- native hypotheses of possible decisions (see Roedig, 1969; Taruffo, 1975). The basic idea is that from the very beginning of a judicial process, and then all along its development, several possible “projects” or “drafts” of decision are submitted to the court by the parties, and some other may be built up by the court itself. Every party alleges her own “version” of the case (or even more than one version) and – correspondingly – she proposes a hypothesis (and sometimes more than one hypothesis) for the final decision of the case. When it is vested with such a power, the court may alternatively find out a further hypothesis http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Judicial Decisions and Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 6 (4) – Oct 16, 2004

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1023/A:1008230426783
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

312 MICHELE TARUFFO be considered as the relatively best approximation to the reality of decision-making in modern legal systems. (a) There is no need, however, to choose a whole theory of judicial decision among the pre-existing and “ready made” theories and to assume it once forever as valid in all its details. Rather, it may be useful just to stress some basic points drawing them from the best theories available. One of these points is that the judicial decision can and should be considered as a set of choices among alter- native hypotheses of possible decisions (see Roedig, 1969; Taruffo, 1975). The basic idea is that from the very beginning of a judicial process, and then all along its development, several possible “projects” or “drafts” of decision are submitted to the court by the parties, and some other may be built up by the court itself. Every party alleges her own “version” of the case (or even more than one version) and – correspondingly – she proposes a hypothesis (and sometimes more than one hypothesis) for the final decision of the case. When it is vested with such a power, the court may alternatively find out a further hypothesis

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 16, 2004

References