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Introduction: Dialectical legal argument: Formal and informal models

Introduction: Dialectical legal argument: Formal and informal models 108 EVELINE FETERIS & HENRY PRAKKEN Historically, perhaps the first AI & Law attempt to address legal reasoning in an adversarial setting was McCarty’s (still ongoing) Taxman project, which aims to formally reconstruct the lines of reasoning in the majority and dissenting opinions of a few leading American tax law cases (see e.g. McCarty, 1995). Perhaps the first system that explicitly defined notions like dispute and dialectical role was Rissland & Ashley’s (1987) HYPO system, which modelled adversarial reasoning with legal precedents. Its output consisted of disputes between the plaintiff and defendant in a legal case, where each dispute is an alternating series of attacks by the defendant on the plaintiff’s claim, and of defences or counterattacks by the plaintiff against these attacks. This work was continued in the CABARET (Rissland & Skalak, 1991) CATO (Aleven & Ashley, 1995) and BANK XXX (Rissland et al., 1997) projects. The main focus of this research strand is defining reasonable or useful dialectical argument moves, corresponding to the moves made by human expert lawyers. Recently, logic-based AI & Law research on defeasible legal reasoning has also resulted in dialectical models of legal argument. Unlike the above-described devel- opments, this ‘logical’ strand focuses http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Introduction: Dialectical legal argument: Formal and informal models

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References (32)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1023/A:1008379702360
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

108 EVELINE FETERIS & HENRY PRAKKEN Historically, perhaps the first AI & Law attempt to address legal reasoning in an adversarial setting was McCarty’s (still ongoing) Taxman project, which aims to formally reconstruct the lines of reasoning in the majority and dissenting opinions of a few leading American tax law cases (see e.g. McCarty, 1995). Perhaps the first system that explicitly defined notions like dispute and dialectical role was Rissland & Ashley’s (1987) HYPO system, which modelled adversarial reasoning with legal precedents. Its output consisted of disputes between the plaintiff and defendant in a legal case, where each dispute is an alternating series of attacks by the defendant on the plaintiff’s claim, and of defences or counterattacks by the plaintiff against these attacks. This work was continued in the CABARET (Rissland & Skalak, 1991) CATO (Aleven & Ashley, 1995) and BANK XXX (Rissland et al., 1997) projects. The main focus of this research strand is defining reasonable or useful dialectical argument moves, corresponding to the moves made by human expert lawyers. Recently, logic-based AI & Law research on defeasible legal reasoning has also resulted in dialectical models of legal argument. Unlike the above-described devel- opments, this ‘logical’ strand focuses

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 3, 2004

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