Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(1959)
Are Smarter Groups More Cooperative ? Evidence from Prisoner ’ s Dilemma Experiments , 1959-2003
David Gill, Victoria Prowse (2014)
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES COGNITIVE ABILITY , CHARACTER SKILLS , AND LEARNING TO PLAY EQUILIBRIUM : A LEVEL-K ANALYSIS
H. Carlsson, E. Damme (1993)
Global Games and Equilibrium SelectionMathematical Methods of Operations Research
M. Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz, G. Spagnolo (2011)
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous TimeEconometrics: Econometric & Statistical Methods - Special Topics eJournal
J. Sell, Rick Wilson (1999)
The Maintenance of Cooperation: Expectations of Future Interaction and the Trigger of Group PunishmentSocial Forces, 77
Anna Dreber, D. Fudenberg, David Rand
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
U Fischbacher (2007)
10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4Exp Econ, 10
T Kawamura (2019)
10.1016/j.rie.2019.01.005Res Econ, 73
J Sell (1999)
10.2307/3005886Soc Forces, 77
M. Blonski, Peter Ockenfels, G. Spagnolo (2011)
Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental EvidenceAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3
E. Proto, A. Rustichini, Andis Sofianos (2017)
Intelligence, Personality, and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated InteractionsJournal of Political Economy, 127
Julian Romero, Yaroslav Rosokha (2017)
Constructing Strategies in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma GameGame Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal
E. Vespa (2020)
An Experimental Investigation of Cooperation in the Dynamic Common Pool GameWiley-Blackwell: International Economic Review
Youngseo Kim (1996)
Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination GamesGames and Economic Behavior, 15
Pablo Brañas-Garza, Teresa García-Muñoz, Roberto González (2012)
Cognitive effort in the Beauty Contest GameJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83
U. Fischbacher (1999)
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 10
I. Barreda-Tarrazona, Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Marina Pavan, Gerardo Sabater-Grande (2017)
Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's DilemmaFrontiers in Psychology, 8
Tetsuya Kawamura, Kazuhito Ogawa (2018)
Cognitive Ability and Human Behavior in Experimental Ultimatum GamesCSN: Economics (Topic)
Nobuyuki Hanaki, N. Jacquemet, S. Luchini, Adam Zylbersztejn (2016)
Fluid Intelligence and Cognitive Reflection in a Strategic Environment: Evidence from Dominance-Solvable GamesFrontiers in Psychology, 7
A Dreber (2014)
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.007J Econ Behav Org, 98
(1936)
Econ 127(3):1351–1390 Raven JC (1936)Mental tests used in genetic studies: The performance of related individuals on tests
Volodymyr Lugovskyy, D. Puzzello, Andrea Sorensen, James Walker, Arlington Williams (2017)
An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods gamesGames Econ. Behav., 102
H. Carlsson (1993)
Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games
J. Carpenter, Michael Graham, Jesse Wolf (2013)
Cognitive ability and strategic sophisticationGames Econ. Behav., 80
(2016)
Zylbersztejn A (2016) Fluid intelligence and cognitive re ection
D. Fudenberg, David Rand, Anna Dreber (2010)
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain WorldLaw & Prosociality eJournal
John Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten (1989)
Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
M Bigoni (2015)
10.3982/ECTA11380Econometrica, 83
P. Bó, Guillaume Fréchette (2011)
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental EvidenceThe American Economic Review, 101
T. Palfrey, H. Rosenthal (1994)
Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental StudyThe Review of Economic Studies, 61
Omar Al-Ubaydli, Garett Jones, Jaap Weel (2016)
Average player traits as predictors of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma ☆Journal of Socio-economics, 64
(1967)
Die strategiemethode zur erforschung des engeschraänkt rationalen verhaltens im rahmen eines oligopolexperiments
(2015)
The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and PrivateEuropean Economics: Microeconomics & Industrial Organization eJournal
(2009)
Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
L. Tan, Lijia Wei (2013)
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Played Over an Infinite HorizonERN: Other Emerging Markets Economics: Firm Behavior & Microeconomic Issues (Topic)
Guillaume Fréchette, S. Yuksel (2013)
Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random terminationExperimental Economics, 20
(1936)
Mental tests used in genetic studies: The performance of related individuals on tests mainly educative and mainly reproductive
Garett Jones (2008)
Are smarter groups more cooperative? Evidence from prisoner's dilemma experiments, 1959–2003Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68
Pedro Bó, Guillaume Fréchette (2015)
Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ DilemmaLogic & Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal
(2019)
Sofianos A (2019) Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation
D Gill (2016)
10.1086/688849J Polit Econ, 124
Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations
J Duffy (2009)
10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.003Games Econom Behav, 66
A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an infinitely repeated public goods game. We designed four treatments with different continuation probability under two conditions: whether cooperation can be sustained as risk dominance or not. We asked participants to decide whether to cooperate in every period in the first five rounds. They were further asked to decide if they should elicit their strategy at the beginning of each super game using the strategy method in the last five rounds. We found that participants with greater cognitive abilities cooperated more (less) when cooperation could (not) be sustained as risk dominance. A similar trend was observed in the frequency of fully cooperative strategies. We also found that participants with greater cognitive abilities employed lenient and forgiving strategies more frequently when the continuation probability was far higher than the risk dominant threshold level.
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 1, 2022
Keywords: Cognitive ability; Infinitely repeated game; Public goods game; Risk dominance; Strategy method; C72; C73; C91; C92
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.