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The market has both a coordination function and an incentive function. The first theorem of welfare economics is all about coordination; the principal-agent model is all about incentives. What is the relative importance of the market in carrying out these two functions? While there has been a shift in economic theory in the past thirty years from emphasizing the coordination role to emphasizing the incentive role, it is not clear whether this reflects a new and deeper understanding of the market. Understanding the market's functions, in real economies, may be key for understanding the degree to which redistribution in them is feasible.
Journal for Labour Market Research – Springer Journals
Published: Mar 30, 2010
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