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Impartial nomination correspondences

Impartial nomination correspondences Among a group of selfish agents, we consider nomination correspondences that determine who should get a prize on the basis of each agent’s nomination. Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica 81:173–196, 2013) show that (i) there is no nomination function that satisfies the axioms of impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and (ii) any impartial nomination function that satisfies the axiom of anonymous ballots is constant (and thus violates positive unanimity). In this article, we show that $$(\mathrm {i})^\prime $$ ( i ) ′ there exists a nomination correspondence, named plurality with runners-up, that satisfies impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and $$(\mathrm {ii})^\prime $$ ( ii ) ′ any impartial nomination correspondence that satisfies anonymous ballots is not necessarily constant, but violates positive unanimity. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Social Choice and Welfare Springer Journals

Impartial nomination correspondences

Social Choice and Welfare , Volume 43 (1) – Nov 5, 2013

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References (8)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Economic Theory; Economics general
ISSN
0176-1714
eISSN
1432-217X
DOI
10.1007/s00355-013-0772-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Among a group of selfish agents, we consider nomination correspondences that determine who should get a prize on the basis of each agent’s nomination. Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica 81:173–196, 2013) show that (i) there is no nomination function that satisfies the axioms of impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and (ii) any impartial nomination function that satisfies the axiom of anonymous ballots is constant (and thus violates positive unanimity). In this article, we show that $$(\mathrm {i})^\prime $$ ( i ) ′ there exists a nomination correspondence, named plurality with runners-up, that satisfies impartiality, positive unanimity, and negative unanimity, and $$(\mathrm {ii})^\prime $$ ( ii ) ′ any impartial nomination correspondence that satisfies anonymous ballots is not necessarily constant, but violates positive unanimity.

Journal

Social Choice and WelfareSpringer Journals

Published: Nov 5, 2013

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