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Henning Herrestad, Formal Theories of Rights

Henning Herrestad, Formal Theories of Rights 94 BOOK REVIEW The opposite position – to wit the thesis of the need for a developed deontic logic – could instead be supported by pointing to the intuitive appropriateness of deontic notions and to the possible theoretical developments that they allow. It was argued that the deontic representations of some legal contexts are in- tuitively plausible, and that normative notions (the adequate treatment of which requires a deontic logic) represent an essential feature of legal and moral discourse. The logical problems of deontic logic, rather than being mere intellectual puzzles, reflect some fundamental issues of legal and moral philosophy. Those issues (e.g., the links between permissions and obligations, the links between alethic and norm- ative modalities, the possibility that norms are violated) are directly relevant to a sensible approach to the formal representation of legal knowledge. It has also been argued that deontic logic is required not only in law and morality, but in any domain which includes normative positions, or which assumes the distinction between real and ideal situations (Jones, 1990). Among those, the specification of security requirements and authorisation mechanisms, the definition of organisation structures and distributed computer systems, the design of database models, etc. In http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

Henning Herrestad, Formal Theories of Rights

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 8 (1) – Oct 3, 2004

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1023/A:1008313700065
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

94 BOOK REVIEW The opposite position – to wit the thesis of the need for a developed deontic logic – could instead be supported by pointing to the intuitive appropriateness of deontic notions and to the possible theoretical developments that they allow. It was argued that the deontic representations of some legal contexts are in- tuitively plausible, and that normative notions (the adequate treatment of which requires a deontic logic) represent an essential feature of legal and moral discourse. The logical problems of deontic logic, rather than being mere intellectual puzzles, reflect some fundamental issues of legal and moral philosophy. Those issues (e.g., the links between permissions and obligations, the links between alethic and norm- ative modalities, the possibility that norms are violated) are directly relevant to a sensible approach to the formal representation of legal knowledge. It has also been argued that deontic logic is required not only in law and morality, but in any domain which includes normative positions, or which assumes the distinction between real and ideal situations (Jones, 1990). Among those, the specification of security requirements and authorisation mechanisms, the definition of organisation structures and distributed computer systems, the design of database models, etc. In

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 3, 2004

References