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From Berman and Hafner’s teleological context to Baude and Sachs’ interpretive defaults: an ontological challenge for the next decades of AI and Law

From Berman and Hafner’s teleological context to Baude and Sachs’ interpretive defaults: an... This paper revisits the challenge of Berman and Hafner’s “missing link” paper on representing teleological structure in case-based legal reasoning. It is noted that this was mainly an ontological challenge to represent some of what made legal reasoning distinctive, which was given less attention than factual similarity in the dominant AI and Law paradigm, deriving from HYPO. The response to their paper is noted and briefly evaluated. A parallel is drawn to a new challenge to provide deep structure to the legal context of textual meaning, drawing on the forthcoming work of two Constitutional law scholars who appear to place some faith in the ways of thinking that AI and Law has developed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Artificial Intelligence and Law Springer Journals

From Berman and Hafner’s teleological context to Baude and Sachs’ interpretive defaults: an ontological challenge for the next decades of AI and Law

Artificial Intelligence and Law , Volume 24 (4) – Oct 13, 2016

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Computer Science; Artificial Intelligence (incl. Robotics); International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law; Philosophy of Law; Legal Aspects of Computing; Information Storage and Retrieval
ISSN
0924-8463
eISSN
1572-8382
DOI
10.1007/s10506-016-9186-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper revisits the challenge of Berman and Hafner’s “missing link” paper on representing teleological structure in case-based legal reasoning. It is noted that this was mainly an ontological challenge to represent some of what made legal reasoning distinctive, which was given less attention than factual similarity in the dominant AI and Law paradigm, deriving from HYPO. The response to their paper is noted and briefly evaluated. A parallel is drawn to a new challenge to provide deep structure to the legal context of textual meaning, drawing on the forthcoming work of two Constitutional law scholars who appear to place some faith in the ways of thinking that AI and Law has developed.

Journal

Artificial Intelligence and LawSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 13, 2016

References